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ADJUDICATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY: THE CONFUSING
PARAMETERS OF STATE, FEDERAL, AND TRIBAL
JURISDICTION
LAURIE REYNOLDS"
I. INTRODUCTION
As a gauge of the strength of the United States government's
commitment to the development of a vital and vigorous tribal ju-
dicial system, the Supreme Court could hardly appear more pos-
itive and unwavering in the language of its decided cases. In
Williams v. Lee,1 the Court issued its first modern opinion
stressing the importance of tribal courts as the desired mecha-
nism for ensuring tribal self-determination.2 That 1959 decision
held that the Arizona state court system lacked subject matter
jurisdiction3 over a lawsuit brought by a non-Indian reservation
trader to collect a debt allegedly owed him by the on-reservation
Indian defendants.4 Recognizing state court jurisdiction, the
Court stressed, would "undermine the authority of the tribal
courts... and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians
* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. The author would like to
thank John Lopatka and Terrill Pollman for their many helpful comments and sug-
gestions, and Gretchen Gende for her able research assistance.
1. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
2. See id at 223. Placed in its historical context, the opinion seems almost re-
markable. Williams was decided during the now much-maligned Termination Era
when Congress legislated to provide for the gradual disappearance of Indian tribes.
See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termina.
tion Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977) (tracing the historical development of
termination policy).
3. Although the Court did not specify in its opinion whether the Arizona court
lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction, commentators agree that the holding
was based on the Court's conclusion that the state court lacked subject matter juris-
diction. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 574-76 (3d ed. 1993).
For a discussion of the confusion and imprecision generated by the Court's frequent
failure to distinguish between different types of jurisdiction in Indian law cases, see
infra notes 205-34 and accompanying text.
4. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 217-18.
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to govern themselves."5 Nearly three decades later, in Iowa Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,6 Justice Marshall's opinion took
the same pro-tribal court stance, emphasizing that "[clivil juris-
diction over [the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands]
presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limit-
ed by a specific treaty provision or federal statute."7
In the context of litigated disputes, of course, these sweeping
affirmations have been translated into specific jurisdictional
holdings. The Supreme Court, as the arbiter of conflicting asser-
tions of state, tribal, and federal power to adjudicate a pending
lawsuit, has issued a number of important opinions that have
attempted to delineate the borders of each forum's adjudicatory
powers.' Unfortunately, lower courts have interpreted the
Court's decisions allocating adjudicatory jurisdiction over dis-
putes involving Indians or occurring in Indian country' as es-
tablishing mechanical, identity-based rules of access.1" More-
over, the Court has created different, and at times contradictory,
lines of precedent depending on the competing forums involved:
that is, one set of rules applies to determine the legitimacy of
state court adjudication, while different considerations shape the
contours of federal court jurisdiction. 1 To confuse matters
more, the Court's staunch endorsement of tribal court adjudica-
tory power has been offset somewhat by its expansive definition
of federal question jurisdiction in Indian country, 2 and by its
increasingly restrictive statements about the scope of tribal gov-
ernmental power over non-Indians. 3
In disputes over the bounds of state adjudicatory power, the
5. Id. at 223.
6. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
7. Id. at 18.
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. As defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994), Indian country includes "all land with-
in the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent." Although the statute de-
fines Indian country for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
also has indicated that the term applies generally "to questions of civil jurisdiction."
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
10. See infra notes 45-63, 87-105 and accompanying text.
11. See discussion infra Part IIA-B.
12. See infra notes 106-23 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
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Court has held that state courts cannot adjudicate on-reserva-
tion disputes involving either a non-Indian plaintiff and an Indi-
an defendant 4 or an Indian plaintiff and Indian defendant;15
in such situations only tribal court adjudication is permissible. If
the plaintiff is a tribe or an individual Indian suing a non-Indi-
an, however, Supreme Court cases suggest that state courts
must adjudicate the controversy. 6 In lawsuits involving multi-
ple parties and multifaceted contacts both on and off the reser-
vation, the rules become less clear, and broad swaths of concur-
rent tribal and state court adjudicatory jurisdiction appear to be
emerging.'7 In contrast to the rules developed for state court
adjudication, the holdings of several recent cases have instructed
federal courts to require that remedies in tribal courts be ex-
hausted in seemingly all lawsuits involving Indians, on-reserva-
tion contacts, or a disputed tribal power. 8
This Article focuses on the rules developed for state and federal
courts to determine the scope of their respective adjudicatory
jurisdictional powers in lawsuits relating to Indian country. 9
14. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
15. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976) (per curiam).
16. In Williams, the Court approved state adjudication of lawsuits "by Indians
against outsiders in state courts." Williams, 358 U.S. at 219. Moreover, the Court's
decisions in Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1984)
(Wold 1), and Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 888-89
(1986) (Wold II), strongly suggest that a state court must allow "an Indian to enter
its court to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian
country." Wold II, 476 U.S. at 888; see infra notes 64-86 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Wacondo v. Concha, 873 P.2d 276 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Chischilly v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 629 P.2d 340 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 628
P.2d 683 (N.M. 1981); Jackson County ex rel. Smoker v. Smoker, 445 S.E.2d 408
(N.C. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 459 S.E.2d 789 (N.C. 1995); Harris v. Young, 473
N.W.2d 141 (S.D. 1991); McCrea v. Denison, 885 P.2d 856 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
18. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's doctrine of exhaustion of tribal reme-
dies, see infra notes 106-53 and accompanying text.
19. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, a growing body of legal schol-
arship has begun to examine the work of tribal courts and their potential ability to
solidify tribal legitimacy and develop appropriate legal norms in Indian country. As
writers such as Frank Pommersheim and Gloria Valencia-Weber have argued, the
non-Indian legal system must allow tribal courts to exercise the same prerogatives of
sovereignty that shaped the federal and state legal systems over the past two cen-
turies. See Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal
Courts and the Role of the Tribal Bar As an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18
N.M. L. REv. 49, 49-50 (1988) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Contextual Legitimacy);
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After reviewing the major Supreme Court decisions in this area,
this Article asserts that both the lower courts and the Supreme
Court itself have converted erroneously those holdings into per se
rules of judicial access that depend on nothing other than the
identity of the litigants." The Article then argues that the Court
should return to the important guiding principles it articulated in
those cases, and that refocusing the inquiry to require careful
analysis of relevant tribal interests can produce a more reasoned
allocation of adjudicatory jurisdiction. In the process, each court's
adjudicatory jurisdictional framework will lose the predictability
generated by the current rules, but in exchange, jurisdictional
analysis will become more coherent, ensuring a more faithful
adherence to well-established judicial doctrines respecting inher-
ent tribal sovereignty and tribal self-determination.
Finally, this Article argues that federal courts should continue
the "hands-off" approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in its
recent articulation of the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal reme-
dies.2 With increasing awareness that tribes should have pri-
mary responsibility for the scope of their own courts' jurisdic-
tion, the Court has insisted that jurisdictional disputes be re-
solved, at least initially, by a tribal court. This Article applauds
that trend but urges the Court to reconsider the expansive ave-
nues of post-tribal court challenges that it has established in
federal courts.22 Subsequently, this Article proposes that Con-
Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Juris-
diction, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 329 (1989) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Crucible]; Frank
Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Juris-
prudence, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 411, 411-13 [hereinafter Pommershein, Liberation];
Frank Pommersheim, A Path near the Clearing: An Essay on Constitutional Adjudi-
cation in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 393-94 (1992) [hereinafter
Pommersheim, Path]; Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31
ARIZ. L. REv. 225, 231-34 (1989); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and
Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225, 225-27 (1994); Fredric Brandfon, Note, Tradi-
tion and Judicial Review in the American Indian Tribal Court System, 38 UCLA L.
REv. 991, 991-92 (1991). Many of the above-cited articles by Professor Pommersheim
have recently been reworked and published by the University of California Press as
a book, entitled Braid of Feathers. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS
(1995) [hereinafter POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS].
20. See infra notes 28-105, 107-53 and accompanying text.
21. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers Un-
ion Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
22. See infra notes 294-303 and accompanying text.
542 [Vol. 38:539
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gress legislate to provide a writ of certiorari from tribal court
judgments to ensure consistency between those decisions and
federal law." The Article concludes by arguing that rejecting
identity-based, per se rules, combined with limiting federal judi-
cial review of tribal court judgments to the writ of certiorari, will
better ensure that a firmly established tribal judicial branch will
enhance the legitimacy of tribal governments, provide stability
in commercial transactions, and offer a fair and efficient forum
for adjudicating the rights and liabilities of Indians and non-
Indians in Indian country.
II. THE CURRENT ALLOCATION OF ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION
IN INDIAN COUNTRY: A TRIPARTITE CONUNDRUM
A. State Court Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
For state courts, the presence of an Indian or tribal litigant or
an on-reservation transaction creates serious questions about
the state forum's ability to adjudicate a pending lawsuit. State
law principles of general subject matter jurisdiction' must
yield to the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the scope of
state adjudicatory jurisdiction of lawsuits related to Indian af-
fairs. These rules establish two distinct, and at times seemingly
inconsistent, lines of cases: one requiring state court adjudicato-
ry jurisdiction in some instances,' the other prohibiting state
court adjudication in other cases." In addition to these judicial-
23. See infra notes 304-05 and accompanying text.
24. In Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (quoting
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)), the Court emphasized the states' broad
concurrent jurisdiction when it noted that "state courts have inherent authority, and
are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the
United States." Id. at 823. Similarly, in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.
502 (1962), the Court described concurrent state adjudicatory jurisdiction as a "com-
mon phenomenon in our judicial history," noting that "exclusive federal court juris-
diction over cases arising under federal law has been the exception rather than the
rule." Id. at 507-08.
The court likewise noted in Tafflin that only Congress could rebut the "deeply
rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction." Tafflin, 493 U.S.
at 459-60.
25. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 888 (1986) (Wold I);
Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1984) (Wold I).
26. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
1997] 543
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ly created jurisdictional rules, distrust of tribal courts and prin-
ciples of equal access to state judicial forums may result in a
grudging and narrow relinquishment of subject matter jurisdic-
tion over controversies that involve Indians or occur in Indian
country.27
1. Prohibiting State Court Adjudication: Williams v. Lee
and its Progeny
The Supreme Court's holding in Williams was straightforward
but important: the Court held that the Arizona state courts were
without jurisdiction to adjudicate a lawsuit filed by a non-Indian
trader against an on-reservation Indian couple for a debt alleg-
edly incurred on the reservation.29 Crucial to the Court's deci-
sion were the defendants' status as reservation Indians" and
the on-reservation location of the transaction." The actual doc-
trinal basis underlying the holding, however, was somewhat
unclear. The Court offered two alternative theories, noting that
the assertion of Arizona adjudicatory jurisdiction both infringed
impermissibly on retained tribal sovereignty32 and was pre-
empted by contrary congressional intent."
Placed in its factual context, the Court's holding emerges as a
carefully balanced opinion that recognized the reality that, with-
out federal protection, the jurisdictional powers of tribal courts
27. See infra notes 258-73 and accompanying text.
28. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
29. See id. at 223.
30. In what is perhaps the most frequently quoted passage of the Williams opin-
ion, the Court stated: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indi-
ans to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Id. at 220.
31. Noting the irrelevance of the non-Indian identity of the plaintiff, the Court
stressed: "It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reserva-
tion and the transaction with an Indian took place there." Id. at 223.
32. See id. at 218-20.
33. At several junctures in the opinion, the Court referred to congressional intent:
"[Wihen Congress has wished the States to exercise this power it has expressly
granted them the jurisdiction," id. at 221; "Implicit in these treaty terms . . . was
the understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively with-
in the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed," id. at 221-22; "If this pow-
er [over reservation affairs] is to be taken away from [the tribe], it is for Congress
to do it." Id. at 223.
[Vol. 38:539544
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would remain undeveloped in the shadow of their state court
counterparts. Because the limited scope of most tribal ordinanc-
es at that time prevented assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction
over unwilling non-Indian defendants,3' the Court's refusal to
establish exclusive tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over a lawsuit
brought by a non-Indian against reservation Indians would have
had the practical effect of eliminating tribal court adjudication of
most disputes involving non-Indians. In addition, the Court was
impressed by the Navajo tribe's "greatly improved.., legal sys-
tem" and "better-trained personnel,"' and by its courts' ability
to exercise jurisdiction over suits by "outsiders against Indian
defendants." 6 Moreover, the Court surely must have realized
that state courts would be unlikely or unable to decipher and
apply tribal law to those disputes for which a choice of law anal-
ysis would indicate its appropriateness. 7 Finally, the Court de-
rived a negative inference of congressional intent from the fact
that although current federal law provided a mechanism for
states to assume broad-ranging jurisdiction over Indian reser-
vations, Arizona had declined to exercise that option."5
34. Only recently have tribes begun to extend the jurisdiction of their courts to
nonresidents. See POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 19, at 87 (noting
the recent amendment of Rosebud Sioux Tribal Code to include nonresident defen-
dante). In fact, model ordinances drafted by the Department of the Interior after
Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994), limited
tribal court adjudication to consenting non-Indians. See William V. Vetter, Doing
Business with Indians and the Three 'S"es: Secretarial Approval, Sovereign Immunity,
and Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 169, 186 n.102 (1994). Vetter not-
ed that "[miore recent tribal code provisions grant the tribal court jurisdiction over
all persons within the reservation, regardless of affiliation or identity, and some
have long-arm statutes." Id. at 186.
35. Williams, 358 U.S. at 222.
36. Id.
37. In a brief discussion of Williams, Professor Laurence has suggested that the
Court suspected "that the Arizona state court [would] have [had] difficulty in discov-
ering Navajo law." Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian
Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589, 617 n.120 (1990). For Laurence, that observation supports
the Court's decision to reject state court jurisdiction rather than to require state
court application of tribal law. See id.
38. That federal law, known as Public Law 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No.
280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994) & 28 U.S.C. §
1360 (1994)), required six states to assume broad jurisdiction over criminal law and
civil adjudication in Indian country. Other states may choose to assume Public Law
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Seventeen years later, in Fisher v. District Court,9 the Su-
preme Court reiterated and reinforced the Williams rule by
holding that a Montana state court could not adjudicate an
adoption proceeding in which all parties were tribal members
and reservation residents. Again, the Court stressed the parties'
Indian identity40 and the on-reservation locus of the dispute41
as crucial factual underpinnings to its conclusion that tribal
court jurisdiction to resolve the adoption dispute was exclusive.
Moreover, the Court was impressed by the readiness of the trib-
al court to adjudicate this controversy; the opinion emphasized
the applicable tribal constitution, the tribal ordinance conferring
jurisdiction upon a tribal court to adjudicate intratribal adoption
proceedings, and the tribal court's advisory opinion to the Mon-
tana court in this case.42 Following the dual strands of analysis
present in Williams, the Court suggested that the state court's
assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction was invalid because it
would both "interfere with the powers of [tribal] self-govern-
ment"" and violate congressional intent."
In the aftermath of Williams and Fisher, state courts have
had ample opportunity to delineate the scope of exclusive tribal
court jurisdiction. Perhaps because of the ambiguous analytical
basis of the holdings, state courts have seized upon the specific
280 authority, but that choice is currently conditioned on tribal approval. See Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 §§ 401-402, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1994). In view of the
clear assimilationist stance of the federal policy in force at the time Williams was
decided, the Court's pro-tribal sovereignty result appears somewhat remarkable. For
an insightful critique and analysis of the Supreme Court's interpretations of Public
Law 280, see Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1165-68 (1990), and
Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reserva-
tion Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975).
39. 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per curiam).
40. See id. at 386 (noting that "this litigation involves only Indians").
41. See id. at 389 ("Since the adoption proceeding is appropriately characterized as
litigation arising on the Indian reservation, the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court is ex-
clusive.").
42. See id. at 384-88.
43. Id. at 387.
44. The Court stressed that "[n]o federal statute sanctions this interference with
tribal self-government." Id. at 388. In fact, at the end of the opinion, the Court flat-
ly stated that state adjudicatory jurisdiction over "litigation involving reservation
Indians . . . has now been preempted." Id. at 390.
[Vol. 38:539546
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facts of the two cases rather than struggle to apply vague no-
tions about the infringement of tribal sovereignty or federal pre-
emption to determine the limits of state court adjudicatory pow-
er. As a result, state courts typically refuse to adjudicate dis-
putes involving Indians or reservation affairs only if the defen-
dant is an Indian and if the transaction involves no substantial
off-reservation contacts. That is, state courts generally assert
jurisdiction over suits brought against a non-Indian defendant
even if the transaction arose in Indian country;45 similarly,
many cases hold that state court adjudication is proper in law-
suits filed against an Indian defendant if the facts reveal sub-
stantial off-reservation contacts.46
45. See, e.g., Kuykendall v. Tim's Buick, Pontiac, GMC & Toyota, Inc., 719 P.2d
1081 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Lambert v. Ryozik, 886 P.2d 378 (Mont. 1994); McCrea
v. Busch, 524 P.2d 781 (Mont. 1974); Paiz v. Hughes, 417 P.2d 51 (N.M. 1966); Fos-
ter v. Luce, 850 P.2d 1034 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); Alexander v. Cook, 566 P.2d 846
(N.M. Ct. App. 1977); Whiting v. Hoffine, 294 N.W.2d 921 (S.D. 1980). For a case in
which a state court declined to exercise jurisdiction in a lawsuit brought by an In-
dian against a non-Indian defendant, see Neadeau v. American Family Mutual Insur-
ance Co., No. C7-93-691, 1993 WL 302127 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1993). In
Neadeau, an Indian sued her insurance company for coverage of an accident arising
on the reservation and involving another Indian, an uninsured motorist. See id. at
*1. Because of the on-reservation locus of the accident and the Indian status of both
parties involved in the accident, the court concluded that state jurisdiction would be
improper, even though the defendant insurance company was non-Indian. See id.
One judge dissented, noting the absence of tribal court jurisdiction to hear the case.
See id. at *2-*3 (Schumacher, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 720 P.2d 499 (Ariz.
1980); Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 885 P.2d 1104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Francisco
v. State, 541 P.2d 955 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975), vacated, 556 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1976);
Crawford v. Roy, 577 P.2d 392 (Mont. 1978); Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d
845 (N.M. 1988); Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 734 P.2d 754 (N.M. 1987);
State Sec. Inc., v. Anderson, 506 P.2d 786 (N.M. 1973); Harris v. Young, 473 N.W.
2d 141 (S.D. 1991); Wells v. Wells, 451 N.W.2d 402 (S.D. 1990). A review of the
cases reveals some variation among the state courts in their determination whether
the standard of "substantial off-reservation contacts" is met. It appears settled, how-
ever, that the standard requires more than the "minimum contacts" ordinarily neces-
sary for finding that a state court has personal jurisdiction over an individual. As
the Supreme Court of North Dakota observed:
[Mie note that the infringement test of Williams v. Lee, while resembling
in some respects a sufficient contacts test for ascertaining personal juris-
diction, is actually a rule for gauging whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the action itself... Furthermore, contacts within the
state but off the reservation, which might arguably suffice to grant a
court personal jurisdiction over an Indian domiciled on a reservation, are
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Although this mechanistic interpretation of the intended scope
of Williams and Fisher may comport with the facts of the two
cases, it is less obviously faithful to the Supreme Court's empha-
sis that state court adjudication would interfere with the right of
sovereign Indian tribes to "make their own laws and be ruled by
them."47 Consider, for instance, the Arizona Supreme Court's
decision in Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co.," in which the court held that the state court had jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate a dispute brought by a plumbing company
supplier against a tribe's surety in a contract to build low in-
come housing on the reservation.49 Crucial to the holding in
Smith Plumbing was the court's conclusion that because the
tribe had reached outside reservation boundaries in this transac-
tion, state court adjudication would not infringe on tribal sover-
eign interests." The dissent, specifically focusing on the in-
fringement language of Williams, concluded that because this
lawsuit would adjudicate the validity of a tribal governmental
act, and because a finding against the insurance company would
work as collateral estoppel in a later adjudication between the
surety and the tribal obligor, the majority's decision had in-
fringed impermissibly on the core of exclusive tribal court juris-
diction established by the Supreme Court. 1 In the dissent's
view, although the case may have involved two non-Indian par-
ties and off-reservation contacts, the proper inquiry into tribal
sovereign infringement would require the state court to decline
to adjudicate.
not necessarily sufficient to grant the court subject matter jurisdiction
under the infringement test.
Byzewski v. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d 394, 398 (N.D. 1988) (citations omitted).
Moreover, for most states, assumption of subject matter jurisdiction also as-
sumes applicability of state substantive law to the dispute. See infra notes 102-03
and accompanying text.
Some state courts, though noting the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in
the state forum, have recognized that considerations of comity might support dis-
missal of a pending lawsuit. See, e.g., In re Custody of K.K.S., 508 N.W.2d 813, 816
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993); In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121, 126 (Mont. 1980).
47. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
48. 720 P.2d at 499.
49. See id. at 506.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 508-12 (Feldman, J., dissenting).
548 [Vol. 38:539
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Similarly, in Lewis v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Oklahoma Housing
Authority,52 the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that a
lower state court had the power to hear a lawsuit brought by
individual Indians against a tribal housing authority. 3 The
Indian plaintiffs in that case claimed that the housing authority
had improperly construed its deed to them as conveying only a
surface estate." Because the off-reservation locus of the trans-
action removed the case from the factual scope of Williams and
Fisher, the court summarily concluded that "there is no infringe-
ment upon tribal self-government,"55 emphasizing that a refusal
of state court jurisdiction in this case would be an "excessive
self-abnegation of power."56 As the facts reveal, however, this
lawsuit actually did implicate strong tribal interests. 7 First
and foremost, the dispute was purely intratribal, and it raised
questions about the applicability of tribal law. Under the po-
tentially applicable tribal ordinance, the tribal housing authority
must retain title to mineral interests in land that it acquires
and must deposit all revenues from the exploitation of those
resources into a tribal account.59 The Oklahoma court, however,
viewing the Supreme Court's decisions as establishing only a
very narrow range of tribal sovereign interests, relied on general
notions of broad state court jurisdiction unless expressly
withheld by an act of Congress" and concluded that applying
state law in a state court was proper.6
Although the final holdings that the state courts in Arizona
and Oklahoma had jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes before
them may be defensible, the cases can be faulted for their focus
on the factual, rather than the analytical, basis of Supreme
Court precedent. That is, the courts have converted the Supreme
Court's holdings into mechanical rules that establish limited
52. 896 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1994).
53. See id. at 512.
54. See ad. at 515.
55. Id. at 508 (emphasis omitted).
56. Id. at 509.
57. See id. at 505-07.
58. See id. at 512-14.
59. See id. at 512.
60. See id. at 509-12.
61. See id.
1997] 549
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spheres of exclusive tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction; any
factual deviation from the landmark cases renders the state
courts capable of adjudicating disputes related to Indians and
Indian country.
The Williams core of exclusive tribal court adjudicatory juris-
diction, though never questioned by the modern Supreme Court
explicitly, nevertheless has emerged as something of a rarity in
current federal Indian law. In recent decisions involving other
jurisdictional disputes in Indian law, the Supreme Court has
shown an increasing willingness to recognize broad spheres of
concurrent jurisdiction between tribal and state governments. 2
For instance, the Court's recent pronouncement that "[s]tates
and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the same territo-
ry,' in addition to weakening general tribal sovereign authori-
ty within the reservation, may also signal a trend toward a new
approach to tribal jurisdictional disputes, a trend starkly at odds
with the Williams line of cases.
2. Requiring State Court Adjudication: The Hazy Lines of
Wold I and II
Prior to its two opinions in Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold
Engineering," the only modern Supreme Court reference to
state court adjudication of lawsuits brought by Indians in state
court had been its somewhat oblique observation in Williams
that "suits by Indians against outsiders in state courts have
been sanctioned."' In those cases, the Court observed, "essen-
tial tribal relations were not involved and.., the rights of Indi-
ans would not be jeopardized."6 Subsequently, in its Wold hold-
ings, the Supreme Court left no doubt that it strongly endorsed
access to state courts for Indians and tribes, notwithstanding
the rule in Williams, which barred non-Indians from state court
62. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
63. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
64. 476 U.S. 877 (1986) (Wold I); 467 U.S. 138 (1984) (Wold 1). For a detailed de-
scription of the state and Supreme Court opinions in this litigation, see William V.
Vetter, The Four Decisions in Three Affiliated Tribes and Pre-Emption by Policy, 23
LAND & WATER L. REV. 43 (1988).
65. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
66. Id.
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in similar reservation-based claims.
The Court's sweeping language in Wold I and Wold II belies
the narrowness of its actual holdings. Despite repeated reference
to judicially created doctrines and general statements about trib-
al sovereignty,' the Supreme Court's holdings actually rest on
a precise, and somewhat perplexing, statutory preemption analy-
sis.' The underlying dispute in the case involved the attempt
by the Fort Berthold Tribes to sue a non-Indian contractor in
state court, alleging negligence and breach of contract for work
on a reservation water supply system. The Supreme Court of
North Dakota had held that state law deprived its courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute." Noting that Pub-
lic Law 280 authorized wide-ranging state assumption of juris-
diction over Indian country,7 ° the court upheld a state statute
conditioning North Dakota's acceptance of jurisdiction under
that federal law on a tribe's acceptance of jurisdiction and waiv-
er of sovereign immunity in state court.7 Because the tribe had
not agreed to state jurisdiction on those terms, the court rea-
soned that the state court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate
the controversy.7"
The United States Supreme Court vacated the decision and
remanded the case, instructing the state court to reconsider its
opinion in light of the Court's elucidation of the federal law prin-
67. For instance, the Court in Wold I noted that "we fail to see how the exercise
of state-court jurisdiction in this case would interfere with the right of tribal Indians
to govern themselves under their own laws." Wold I, 467 U.S. at. 148. The Court
continued: "As a general matter, tribal self-government is not impeded when a State
allows an Indian to enter its courts on equal terms with other persons... ." Id, at
148-49. Similarly, in Wold II, the Court emphasized that state adjudication "did not
interfere with the right of tribal Indians to govern themselves." Wold II, 476 U.S. at
880. The Court did, however, emphasize the "trend... away from the idea of in-
herent Indian sovereignty as a[n independent] bar to state jurisdiction and toward
reliance on federal pre-emption.' Id. at 884 (quoting Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713,
718 (1983)).
68. See Wold II, 476 U.S. at 883-93; Wold I, 467 U.S. at 149-51.
69. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 321 N.W.2d 510, 512 (N.D. 1982),
cert. granted, 461 U.S. 904 (1983), vacated, 467 U.S. 138 (1984).
70. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1996) & 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)); see supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text.
71. See Wold, 321 N.W.2d at 512.
72. See id.
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ciples guiding the controversy.73 Because the Supreme Court
was concerned that the North Dakota court's opinion was based
on the erroneous assumption that federal law precluded the
state from accepting adjudicatory jurisdiction in the case,74 the
Court remanded for reconsideration of the jurisdictional issue.
On remand, the North Dakota court reiterated its earlier hold-
ing that North Dakota law precluded state adjudication of the
controversy.76 With the state court opinion now resting square-
ly on state law grounds, the Supreme Court again reversed, this
time holding that federal law preempted the state statute."
The majority's curious preemption analysis, which was vigor-
ously criticized in the dissenting opinion of Justices Rehnquist,
Brennan and Stevens,7 seemed to connect unrelated factual ob-
servations to reach its conclusion. First, the majority noted that
Public Law 280, though providing a means for state assumption
of jurisdiction in Indian country, had no effect on lawful preex-
isting state adjudicatory jurisdiction.79 Moreover, as the majori-
ty observed, amendments to Public Law 280 outlined the proper
procedure for subsequent state relinquishment of jurisdiction
acquired pursuant to that federal law."o At this point, the anal-
ysis became somewhat strained-because of the comprehensive-
ness of Public Law 280's amendments, the Court concluded that
those amendments preempted the field of state retrocession of
jurisdiction, whether acquired pursuant to Public Law 280 or on
the basis of a state's inherent preexisting jurisdiction.8 Thus,
because the federal statute made no provision for state relin-
quishment of jurisdiction lawfully assumed prior to the enact-
73. See Wold I, 467 U.S. at 141.
74. See id. at 150-51.
75. See id. at 141.
76. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 364 N.W.2d 98, 103-04 (N.D.), rev'd,
476 U.S. 877 (1986).
77. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 887 (1986) (Wold 11).
78. See id. at 893 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 882. The scope of that lawfully assumed jurisdiction, however, would
seem to be limited by the Court's holdings in Williams and Fisher, even though
those cases were decided after the enactment of Public Law 280. See Wold I, 467
U.S. at 160-61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. See Wold II, 476 U.S. at 886-87.
81. See id. at 886.
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ment of Public Law 280, the majority concluded that the states
had absolutely no power to retrocede or otherwise limit the
scope of that preexisting jurisdiction.82 Because North Dakota
had asserted subject matter jurisdiction in pre-Public Law 280
cases involving Indians, the Court concluded that North Dakota
must continue to exercise all subject matter jurisdiction not oth-
erwise foreclosed by decisions such as Williams and Fisher."
As a matter of statutory analysis, the majority opinions in
Wold I and Wold II stand on shaky ground, strained in their
reasoning and based on erroneous assumptions about the state
law precedents upon which they depend. Although it may be
tempting to dismiss the Wold holdings as narrowly focused and
limited to the precise statutory preemption issue that they spe-
cifically decided, such casual treatment would be a mistake.
Throughout the opinions, the Court expressed a broad and gen-
eralized insistence that Indian tribes and individual Indians be
allowed to bring their reservation-based claims to state court.
For example, in Wold I, the Court noted: "As a general matter,
tribal self-government is not impeded when a State allows an
Indian to enter its courts on equal terms with other persons to
seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in
Indian country."" In Wold II, the Court similarly encouraged
tribal access to state courts, stating:
This Court and many state courts have long recognized that
Indians share this interest in access to the courts, and that
tribal autonomy and self-government are not impeded when a
State allows an Indian to enter its court to seek relief against
a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country."
In cases applying the Wold holdings, state courts have in fact
interpreted the Court's language as requiring state court adjudi-
cation of litigation arising on the reservation, so long as an Indi-
an or a tribe files the lawsuit.86
82. See id.
83. See id. at 886-87.
84. Wold I, 467 U.S. at 148-49.
85. Wold II, 476 U.S. at 888.
86. See, e.g., Foster v. Luce, 850 P.2d 1034 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
state court had jurisdiction over the Indian plaintiffs tort claim involving tortious
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3. Williams's Uneasy Coexistence with Wold I and Wold II
The rules pertaining to state court jurisdiction over litigation
that involves Indians or reservation-based incidents have been
reduced to a straightforward two-part inquiry. State court juris-
diction is prohibited only if the transaction involves no substan-
tial off-reservation contacts and a non-Indian plaintiff sues an
Indian defendant.' Under this interpretation, the state courts
have wide-ranging adjudicatory powers in Indian-related litiga-
tion; if either of the two conditions is not met, state adjudication
is proper. This mechanical approach, though perhaps the Su-
preme Court's intended result, requires no examination of tribal
sovereign interests and reduces the Supreme Court's insistence
that state adjudication not infringe improperly upon tribal sov-
ereign interests to background noise. In addition, even if the
combined effects of Williams, which prohibits state court adjudi-
cation of on-reservation lawsuits filed by non-Indians, and
Wold's apparent requirement of state adjudication when an Indi-
an or tribe initiates the lawsuit' raise no problems under the
federal Equal Protection Clause,89 at a minimum it produces
acts that occurred in part on a reservation); see also Wacondo v. Concha, 873 P.2d
276 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that federal law does not preempt state court's
concurrent jurisdiction over torts committed within the boundaries of one pueblo by
a member of another pueblo).
87. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89. In a different context, the Supreme Court has upheld classifications based on
the Native American status of the affected individuals, stating that the classification
was political rather than racial because it applied to individuals on the basis of
their membership in a particular tribe. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553
n.24 (1974). In Fisher u. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per curiam), the Court
rejected the argument of the Indian plaintiffs that denial of access to a state judicial
forum deprived them of the equal protection of the law. See id. at 390-91. The Court
noted:
The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the
race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the . . .
Tribe under federal law. Moreover, even if a jurisdictional holding occa-
sionally results in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-
Indian has access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is justified be-
cause it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by fur-
thering the congressional policy of Indian self-government.
Id. Subsequently, in Wold I, the Court declined to decide whether a denial of a
state judicial forum to Indian plaintiffs violated federal constitutional law. See Wold
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widespread disgruntlement among state courts and no doubt
enhances the antagonism they feel toward tribal institutions.'
Moreover, in an extreme case, the Williams rule requires de-
tailed and intrusive inquiry to corroborate the Indian status of
the party seeking state court adjudication. For example, because
state court adjudication of on-reservation disputes is proper only
if the plaintiff is an Indian, opposing parties may challenge the
court's jurisdiction by questioning whether the plaintiff actually
is an Indian."'
I, 467 U.S. at 151-52 & n.12. A similar, unresolved question is whether denial of a
state judicial forum to non-Indians, when Indian plaintiffs have free access to the
same forum, runs afoul of any of those protections.
90. For example, in Security State Bank v. Pierre, 511 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1973), the
court reluctantly held that, under applicable Supreme Court precedent, its judicial
system had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a lawsuit filed by a non-Indian involving a
commercial transaction that the plaintiff had entered into with an Indian on the
reservation. See id. at 326, 329-30. In responding to the plaintiffs arguments that
the denial of state jurisdiction produced "a special class of citizens having 'rights' not
afforded other citizens of the state while at the same time denying basic constitu-
tional rights to those with whom the Indians create obligations," id. at 329, the
court simply agreed, noting that under the Supreme Court's "erroneous concept" of
exclusive tribal court jurisdiction, "there is little state courts can do to afford the
equal protection of our law to both its Indian and nonIndian [sic] citizens." Id.
A concurring justice in Geiger v. Pierce, 758 P.2d 279 (Mont. 1988), voiced simi-
lar frustration: "It seems basically unfair to allow an Indian person to use the state
courts so long as that person decides it is to her benefit, but to deny the non-Indian
party an equivalent right of access to the same court in [the same] dispute." Id. at
282 (Weber, J., specially concurring). Perhaps most frustrating to Justice Weber was
that the Indian defendant in Geiger did not raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction
as a defense until after a judgment was entered against her. See id. Recognizing
that the majority had correctly noted that "the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
may be invoked at any time in the course of a proceeding," id. at 281 (quoting In re
Marriage of Lance, 690 P.2d 979, 981 (Mont. 1984)), Justice Weber complained both
that the plaintiff salesman "was constitutionally forbidden from asking the defendant
if she was an Indian" at the time of the sale, and that the court itself had no rea-
son to inquire during the trial whether defendant "was an Indian. . . who claimed
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 282 (Weber, J., specially concurring).
91. In Sanapaw u. Smith, 335 N.W.2d 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), for instance, the
Indian plaintiff and his tribal employer sought civil damages for an assault and bat-
tery occurring on the reservation. The defendant argued that the state court had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate the lawsuit because Williams and Fisher required exclusive
tribal court jurisdiction over the dispute. See id. The court of appeals reversed the
lower court's conclusion that it had subject matter jurisdiction and remanded for a
determination of the defendant's "status as either an Indian or a non-Indian for ju-
risdictional purposes." Id at 429. Moreover, the court also instructed the lower court
to consider the defendant's "racial status, habits, and lifestyle . . . [including] a de-
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
In fairness to the state courts, the Supreme Court appears to
endorse the way in which its holdings have been applied; in fact,
approving references to the identity-based rules are scattered
throughout its opinions. That is, although the cases appear to
champion tribal sovereign interests, the fact-based litmus test
receives tacit approval in these very same cases. Indicating the
limited scope of its newly created rule barring state adjudica-
tion, for example, the Court in Williams noted pointedly that
state courts previously (and apparently properly) had assumed
jurisdiction over lawsuits filed by Indian plaintiffs.92 Moreover,
in its decision in Fisher, the Court expressly recognized that the
scope of state court jurisdiction hinged on the Indian status of
the parties." Similarly, the Wold opinions specifically accepted
the apparent imbalance between Williams's prohibition of state
court jurisdiction and the Wold cases' insistence that jurisdiction
depends on the Indian status of the parties.'
Reducing these important holdings to their facts, however,
improperly obviates the need for reasoned analysis of tribal sov-
ereign interests and produces rules that are both too broad and
too narrow in their sweep. Specifically, the lower courts' inter-
pretations are too narrow because they fail to recognize the pos-
sibly important tribal sovereign interests in the adjudication of
many lawsuits involving Indian plaintiffs or off-reservation con-
tacts. At the same time, because Williams protects a small core
termination of his residence, since place of residence could be important evidence of
whether [the defendant] ha[d] adopted a non-Indian lifestyle." Id. at 430.
92. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) ("Thus, suits by Indians against
outsiders in state courts have been sanctioned.").
93. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387 (1976) (per curiam) ("State-
court jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the powers of self-government con-
ferred upon the . . . Tribe .. . . It would subject a dispute arising on the reserva-
tion among reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they have established
for themselves.").
94. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 893 (1986) (Wold 11)
("The perceived inequity of permitting the Tribe to recover from a non-Indian for
civil wrongs in instances where a non-Indian allegedly may not recover against the
Tribe simply must be accepted in view of the overriding federal and tribal interests
in these circumstances . . . ."); Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138,
148-49 (1984) (Wold 1) ("As a general matter, tribal self-government is not impeded
when a State allows an Indian to enter its courts . . . to seek relief against a non-
indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country.").
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of exclusive tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction that encom-
passes only those cases involving a non-Indian plaintiff and ex-
clusively on-reservation contacts, as cross-reservation transac-
tions become increasingly important to reservation life, the rule
applies in a decreasing number of cases. Moreover, the courts'
interpretations may be too broad in their apparent conclusions
that tribal sovereign interests can be served only by exclusive
tribal court jurisdiction.
As the two lines of cases involving state court adjudication of
Indian lawsuits merge, the resulting imbalance between Wil-
liams, which bars non-Indian plaintiffs from state court adjudi-
cation of many reservation-based claims, 5 and Wold, which in-
sists that Indians and tribes be free to bring a lawsuit involving
on-reservation transactions in state court, 6 rests uneasily on
the Court's assumption that, while state adjudication of the for-
mer class of cases would infringe upon tribal sovereignty, no in-
fringement would occur in the latter class of cases. 7 Upon clos-
er consideration, this distinction simply cannot stand. If the in-
fringement at issue is, as the Court in Williams emphasized,
"the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them,"8 the plaintiffs identity should be irrelevant to
determining whether tribal sovereignty is infringed. For exam-
ple, in an on-reservation traffic accident involving an Indian and
a non-Indian, it is difficult to understand how the tribal sover-
eign interest would be infringed by state court adjudication if
the non-Indian brings the lawsuit99 but not infringed if the In-
95. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
96. See Wold II, 476 U.S. at 888-89; Wold I, 467 U.S. at 148-49.
97. See supra note 94.
98. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
99. See, e.g., Hartley v. Baca, 640 P.2d 941 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); Nelson v.
Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975); see also Geiger v. Pierce, 758 P.2d 279 (Mont.
1988) (holding that a state court cannot adjudicate a lawsuit filed by a non-Indian
creditor for a debt allegedly incurred by an Indian at a creditor's office located with-
in the borders of a reservation); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eagleman, 705 P.2d 1117
(Mont. 1985) (holding that a state court has no jurisdiction over a civil suit filed
against an Indian by a non-Indian insurer for damages occurring on a reservation to
an insured vehicle); Kain v. Wilson, 161 N.W.2d 704 (S.D. 1968) (holding that a
state court has no power to adjudicate a suit brought by a non-Indian alleging tres-
pass by an Indian defendant on land within the borders of a reservation that is
owned by the non-Indian). In all of these transactions, however, the state court
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dian is the first to file.00 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in
its Wold opinions explicitly affirmed such an illogical allocation
of adjudicatory jurisdiction. 1 '
Similarly, some courts automatically ignore potential tribal
sovereign interests in lawsuits that display substantial off-reser-
vation contacts. For those courts, the jurisdiction inquiry is tan-
tamount to a choice of law analysis. That is, the presence of sub-
stantial off-reservation contacts automatically has a two-pronged
result: the state court has adjudicatory jurisdiction, and state
law applies to the dispute.0 2 In contrast, other courts have as-
sumed adjudicatory jurisdiction over a lawsuit because of sub-
stantial off-reservation contacts but nevertheless entertained the
possibility that tribal law would apply to resolve the dispute."°
would have adjudicated the dispute if the Indian party had been the plaintiff rather
than the defendant. See cases cited infra note 100.
100. See, e.g., Lambert v. Ryozik, 886 P.2d 378 (Mont. 1994); McCrea v. Busch, 524
P.2d 781 (Mont. 1974); Paiz v. Hughes, 417 P.2d 51 (N.M. 1966). The United States
filed an amicus curiae brief in the Paiz case urging assertion of state court adjudica-
tory jurisdiction. See id. at 54.
101. In Wold I, the Court noted:
[T]o the extent that [state law] permitted ... state courts to exercise ju-
risdiction over claims by non-Indians against Indians or over claims be-
tween Indians, it intruded impermissibly on tribal self-governance....
This Court, however, repeatedly has approved the exercise of jurisdiction
by state courts over claims by Indians against non-Indians, even when
those claims arose in Indian country.
467 U.S. at 148 (citations omitted).
102. In R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979 (9th
Cir. 1983), for instance, a non-Indian contractor sued in federal court to challenge
the tribal court's jurisdiction over a lawsuit filed by a tribal housing authority alleg-
ing deficiencies in the contractor's performance under a contract. See id. at 980-81.
The court applied a choice of law analysis to determine whether state subject matter
jurisdiction existed. Because the court determined that tribal law might apply to the
pending contract dispute, it also concluded that the state court had no jurisdiction to
hear the lawsuit. See id. at 983. State courts often adopt a similar stance, frequent-
ly assuming the applicability of state law if state court jurisdiction is proper. See,
e.g., Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 720 P.2d 499, 506 (Ariz. 1986);
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 883 P.2d 136, 144 (N.M. 1994);
Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d 845, 850-51 (N.M. 1988); Foundation Reserve
Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 734 P.2d 754, 755-56 (N.M. 1987); Boller v. Key Bank, 829 P.2d
260, 263-64 (Wyo. 1992).
103. See, e.g., Chischilly v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 629 P.2d 340, 342-44
(N.M. Ct. App. 1980) noting that "the usual conflicts of laws rules should be used to
determine whose law to apply" and concluding that the law of the situs, the reserva-
tion, should apply to the dispute), rev'd, 628 P.2d 683 (N.M. 1981); Lewis v. Sac &
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Although some have suggested that tribal sovereign interests
are better protected by a strict prohibition of state application of
tribal law,1"" in many cases that prohibition may actually ig-
nore important tribal interests. As tribes and individual Indians
enter into an ever-increasing array of commercial transactions
off the reservation and with non-Indians, exclusively on-reserva-
tion transactions decrease in frequency and importance. If state
courts may freely ignore tribal interests in any dispute dis-
playing off-reservation contacts, the sovereignty that Williams so
vehemently protected will be reduced to a tiny core of exclusive
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction. Consistency with Williams's
insistence on the protection of tribal law-making authority
should require state courts to engage in a careful choice of law
analysis to determine whether tribal law should apply, notwith-
standing the presence of sufficient off-reservation contacts to
permit state adjudication of the lawsuit.
Finally, in some ways, the scope of exclusive tribal court adju-
dicatory power may be too broad. The Court in Williams never
explained how the mere adjudication of a reservation-based law-
suit in state court would infringe on the sovereign prerogative of
the tribal government to exercise its governmental powers over
its members and its territories. After all, state courts are fully
cognizant and respectful of the sovereignty of other states, the
federal government, and even of other countries, yet this respect
does not impede state court adjudication of a lawsuit occurring
within the borders or under the jurisdiction of the other sover-
eign. The crucial difference, perhaps, is that state courts have
been unable or unwilling to accord to tribal law the same sover-
eign respect given to the law of other states or countries. As that
reality changes, and as states increasingly recognize the force
and legitimacy of tribal law,"5 and as tribal courts themselves
Fox Tribe of Okla. Hous. Auth., 896 P.2d 503, 512-14 (Okla. 1994) (rejecting an ar-
gument that tribal law should apply to resolve the dispute); Warm Springs Forest
Prods. Indus. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 703 P.2d 1008, 1010-11 (Or. Ct. App.
1985) (rejecting arguments that tribal law should apply to determine the validity of
an insurance contract), affd, 716 P.2d 740 (Or. 1986).
104. Cf. Laurence, supra note 37, at 617-18 n.120 (questioning state courts' abilities
to apply tribal law).
105. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
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become more formalized and expansive in their operations, tribal
sovereign interests may be adequately protected even in state
court adjudication of lawsuits involving Indians and transactions
arising on the reservation.
B. Federal Court Jurisdiction
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1985 holding in National Farm-
ers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,"6 federal
courts frequently had dismissed for lack of a federal question
lawsuits involving on-reservation contracts," 7 leases,' per-
sonal injury,1"9 or any purely intratribal conflicts."0 Stressing
that "federal question jurisdiction does not exist merely because
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 150 (1993) (asserting that U.S.
courts must give full faith and credit to tribal court judgments); P.S. Deloria &
Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The
Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. RIV. 365, 373-
74 (1994) (urging state-tribal cooperation in the cross-enforcement of state and tribal
court judgments); Laurence, supra note 37, at 648-73 (discussing full faith and cred-
it); Karla Engle, Note, Red Fox v. Hettich: Does South Dakota's Comity Statute Fos-
ter Unwarranted State Court Intrusion into Tribal Jurisdictional Authority over Civil
Disputes?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 706 (1993) (analyzing state court application of the comity
statute); Darby L. Hoggatt, Comment, The Wyoming Tribal Full Faith and Credit
Act: Enforcing Tribal Judgments and Protecting Tribal Sovereignty, 30 LAND & WA-
TER L. REv. 531, 549-57 (1995) (analyzing a Wyoming state statute providing for
recognition of tribal court judgments). State courts are beginning to recognize and
enforce tribal court judgments in a range of situations. See, e.g., Fredericks v. Eide-
Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990) (enforcing
tribal court judgment as a matter of comity); One Feather v. O.S.T. Pub. Safety
Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 48, 49-50 (S.D. 1992) (recognizing tribal court order for comity
reasons); Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737, 740-42 (S.D. 1985) (recognizing
tribal court order solely on basis of comity principles).
106. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
107. See, e.g., Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. Apex Constr. Co., 757 F.2d 221, 223
(10th Cir. 1985); Gila River Indian Community v. Henningson, Durham & Richard-
son, 626 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1980); Jackson v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 1243,
1247-48 (D. Alaska 1980); Blackfeet Tribe v. Wippert, 442 F. Supp. 65, 66-68 (D.
Mont. 1977); Ware v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 344, 346-47 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
108. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rollingson v. Blackfeet Tribal Court, 244 F.
Supp. 474, 476-77 (D. Mont. 1965).
109. See, e.g., Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 69 (8th Cir. 1974); Meeks v.
McAdams, 390 F.2d 650, 651 (10th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
499 F. Supp. 1317, 1321-23 (D. Ariz. 1980), affd, 682 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982).
110. See, e.g., Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 921 (10th Cir. 1957)
(dismissing claim of wrongful denial of membership in Indian tribe for lack of feder-
al question jurisdiction).
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an Indian tribe is a party or the case involves a contract with an
Indian tribe,""' the lower federal courts routinely rejected liti-
gants' attempts to convert the federal court into a "small claims
court for all [Indian] disputes.""' Leaving the dispute over ad-
judicatory jurisdiction to state and tribal courts, federal courts
presumably assumed that the analysis in Williams v. Lee..
would guide the determination of the proper forum."' The Su-.
preme Court, in fact, appeared to endorse this "hands-off' ap-
proach when it ruled in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez"5 that
the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear a civil cause of ac-
tion brought against an Indian tribe".6 pursuant to the federal
Indian Civil Rights Act."'
The landscape changed dramatically when the Court an-
nounced its astonishingly broad definition of federal question
jurisdiction in National Farmers Union."' In that case, the
Court established a greatly enlarged sphere of federal question
jurisdiction in Indian law cases when it declared that "[tihe
question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to compel a
non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a
tribal court is one that must be answered by reference to federal
law and is a 'federal question' under § 1331.""' Tempering the
rule's immediate impact, however, the Supreme Court imposed
the requirement that those newly created federal question cases
first had to proceed through the tribal court system.' Exhaus-
tion of tribal remedies, the Court stressed, would be faithful to
Congress's firm commitment to tribal self-government. 2' Two
years later, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,"2 the
111. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).
112. Gila River Indian Community, 626 F.2d at 715.
113. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
114. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
115. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
116. See id. at 72.
117. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
118. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852
(1985).
119. Id. at 852.
120. See id. at 853-57.
121. See id. at 856.
122. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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Court expanded the rule to apply to cases brought under the
diversity statute.1 s
During the decade following the adoption of the tribal exhaus-
tion rule, lower federal courts have struggled to divine its in-
tended scope. Lower court opinions reveal broad disagreement
on issues such as the applicability of the exhaustion requirement
when no tribal court suit is pending, 2  the relevance of the
adequacy of the available tribal remedy,"= and the scope of
postexhaustion review. 2 ' The disagreement even extends to
123. See id. at 16.
124. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 901 n.2 (9th Cir.
1991) (refusing to require exhaustion when no tribal suit was pending); accord Altheimer
& Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1993); Weeks Constr., Inc. v.
Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 672 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986); Vance v. Boyd Miss.,
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Miss. 1996). Other courts have ordered exhaustion in the
same situation, concluding that concerns for tribal sovereignty are equally implicated, re-
gardless of the pendency of a tribal proceeding, any time the federal court is asked to
resolve a lawsuit that falls within the scope of tribal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Duncan
Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1299-300 (8th Cir. 1994); Texaco,
Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374, 1376 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724,
728 (9th Cir. 1992); Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407-08 (9th Cir.
1991); Burlington N. R.R. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768, 771-72 (D.N.M. 1994); Cropmate Co. v. Indian
Resources Intl, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 744, 747 n.3 (D. Mont. 1993); Haul v.
Wahquahboshkuk, 838 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (D. Kan. 1993); Middlemist v. Secretary of
the United States Dep't of Interior, 824 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Mont. 1993), afld, 19 F.3d
1318 (9th Cir. 1994).
125. In Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403 (W.D.N.C. 1993),
for instance, the court conditioned its willingness to require exhaustion of tribal rem-
edies on the tribal court's protection of the non-Indian plaintiff from self-help reme-
dies undertaken by the defendant tribe, and on its promise of at least three days
notice to the plaintiff before enforcing a tribal court order. See id. at 406-07. The
federal district court in Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 788
F. Supp. 566 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 999 F.2d 503 (11th Cir. 1993), issued a similar
warning to the tribal court when it ordered the parties to exhaust their tribal rem-
edies. See id. at 570.
126. The Supreme Court itself suggested two very different standards in its exhaus-
tion opinions. The National Farmers Union opinion appears to have anticipated ex-
tensive federal review, insisting on the development of a full tribal court record "be-
fore either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed [by
the federal court]." National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856. In its subsequent
opinion in Iowa Mutual, however, the Court seemed to endorse a far more restrictive
role for postexhaustion review in federal court, noting that "proper deference to the
tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues raised by the [insurance law dis-
pute] and resolved in the Tribal Courts." Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19. The Ninth
Circuit was the first federal appellate court to define standards for postexhaustion
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the basic issue of whether the rule applies to all disputes over
tribal jurisdiction, broadly defined to include legislative and
regulatory jurisdiction, or whether the exhaustion requirement
is better understood as applying exclusively to challenges to the
scope of a tribal court's adjudicatory jurisdiction. 7
In spite of the many crucial unresolved questions surrounding
the implementation of the tribal exhaustion rule, it is fair to say
that most federal courts routinely require exhaustion for a law-
suit involving Indians or on-reservation transactions."s The
Ninth Circuit, in Stock West Corp. v. Taylor,"2 for example, or-
dered exhaustion of tribal remedies in a case brought by a non-
Indian corporation against a non-Indian tribal attorney for legal
malpractice, even though the basis of the alleged malpractice
was a letter delivered in Portland, Oregon.130 In the Ninth
Circuit's view, the defendant's claim of tribal jurisdiction re-
quired exhaustion because the claim was at least "colorable."13" '
review of tribal court opinions. See FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311,
1313 (9th Cir. 1990). In FMC, the court stated that the tribal court's factual deter-
minations should be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard, and federal legal
questions would receive de novo review. See id. at 1313. The Eighth Circuit subse-
quently endorsed this approach. See Duncan Energy, 27 F.3d at 1300. The Tenth
Circuit has adopted and applied the FMC rule. See Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison,
94 F.3d 1382,'1384 (10th Cir. 1996).
127. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has refused to require exhaustion of tribal
remedies in a lawsuit challenging tribal power to tax a non-Indian railroad's on-res-
ervation right-of-way, implying that exhaustion was inappropriate in challenges to
tribal legislative authority. See Burlington Northern, 924 F.2d at 901 n.2, 904-05
(refusing to require tribal exhaustion and resolving the merits of a dispute over trib-
al legislative power to impose tax on a railroad right-of-way). Other federal courts
have expressed concern about the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine to cases
involving challenges to the tribe's sovereignty-based regulatory authority. See, e.g.,
Duncan Energy, 27 F.3d at 1301-03 (Loken, J., concurring); Altheimer & Gray, 983
F.2d at 814. Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has not ordered exhaustion in vari-
ous challenges to tribal sovereign power. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508
U.S. 679 (1993); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195
(1985). In none of these cases did the Court address the appropriateness of tribal
exhaustion, even though the cases all arose after the Court's holding in National
Farmers Union.
128. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1991)
("The requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies is not discretionary, it is mandatory.").
129. 964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
130. See id. at 914-16, 919-20.
131. Id. at 919.
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For the dissenting judge, the court's opinion established an un-
warranted extension of the Supreme Court's rule, ordering ex-
haustion of tribal remedies upon any "[tialismanic invocation of
tribal court jurisdiction."1 2
As applied by the lower federal courts, the exhaustion rule
stands in stark contrast to the other Supreme Court rules delin-
eating the proper spheres of state and tribal adjudicatory juris-
diction. Application of the identity-based rules derived from Wil-
liams and from Wold I and Wold II, in fact, will result in state
court assumption of adjudicatory jurisdiction over many cases
that the exhaustion rule would consign to the tribal courts.13 1
In the Montana Supreme Court's recent decision in Lambert v.
Ryozik,3 for instance, the court found that the state court had
adjudicatory jurisdiction over a personal injury lawsuit occurring
within the exterior boundaries of a reservation and filed by en-
rolled members of the tribe against non-Indian defendants. 13 5
Surely, under the Supreme Court's exhaustion rules, that case
belonged in tribal court.1
36
Similarly, although the Ninth Circuit in Stock West3'7 directed
a legal malpractice suit involving off- and on-reservation contacts
to tribal court, state courts have assumed jurisdiction over nearly
identical lawsuits. 38 Although one recent lower federal court
case has suggested that the exhaustion doctrine should also apply
to limit state adjudication of cases involving Indians or arising on
132. Id. at 921 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
133. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text; see also Richard W. Hughes,
Indian Law, 18 N.M. L. REv. 403, 450 (1988) ("[The exhaustion doctrine] essentially
forces into tribal courts every case that could be brought there, whether the court's
jurisdiction would be exclusive, under Williams v. Lee, or merely concurrent with the
state court.").
134. 886 P.2d 378 (Mont. 1994).
135. See id. at 380.
136. In fact, the facts in Lambert are remarkably similar to the facts of the Court's first
exhaustion opinion, in which Indians sued a state school for injuries from an accident
that occurred on school grounds, within the borders of a reservation. See National Farm-
ers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 847 (1985).
137. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Crawford v. Roy, 577 P.2d 392, 394 (Mont. 1978) (holding that the state
court has jurisdiction over a debt action filed by non-Indian investigators against an
Indian attorney for investigative services performed on and off the reservation).
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the reservation,'39 few state courts have declined to exercise ad-
judicatory jurisdiction to allow tribal court resolution. 4
Language in Supreme Court opinions appears to endorse this
unbalanced allocation of adjudicatory jurisdiction. On the one
hand, the Court has stressed that federal court adjudication of
on-reservation disputes would "place [the federal forum] in di-
rect competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the
latter's authority over reservation affairs." 4' With the Court's
exhaustion analysis, the potential infringement then comes from
nontribal adjudication rather than -from the identity of the par-
ties. On the other hand, the Court's analysis of tribal sovereign
infringement is very different when the competing nontribal
forum is the state court system. In such contexts, the Court has
insisted that state court adjudication of on-reservation disputes,
so long as an Indian is the plaintiff, has no negative impact on
retained tribal sovereignty: "[Tiribal self-government is not im-
peded when a State allows an Indian to enter its courts on equal
terms with other persons to seek relief against a non-Indian
concerning a claim arising in Indian country."'42 As a practical
matter, moreover, state courts may hesitate to follow the Su-
preme Court's exhaustion rules because of the finality that they
bring to state adjudication; in contrast to the federal forum,
where postexhaustion review clearly is anticipated and sanc-
tioned, state court review of tribal court judgments would be
limited to a state court's refusal to enforce a tribal court judg-
ment off the reservation. 43 Whatever the explanation, for po-
139. See Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99, 123-26 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
140. See Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995) (interpreting the Supreme Court's exhaustion doctrine to apply to
state as well as federal court). In a similar vein, the dissenting justice in Smith
Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 720 P.2d 499 (Ariz. 1986), argued
that the Supreme Court's exhaustion rules required the state court to defer to the
tribal court. See id. at 508 (Feldman, J., dissenting). In fairness to state courts,
however, the Supreme Court never has indicated that its exhaustion rule should af-
fect the Williams analysis.
141. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
142. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1984) (Wold 1);
see also Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 880 (1986) (Wold II)
("[State court] recognition of jurisdiction over the claims of Indian plaintiffs against
non-Indian defendants .. . did not interfere with the right of tribal Indians to gov-
ern themselves . . .).
143. See Robert B. Porter, Note, The Jurisdictional Relationship Between the Iro.
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tential litigants, Indian and non-Indian alike, the two starkly
contrasting sets of rules present a bewildering and seemingly
illogical conundrum.
In addition, the endorsement of broad tribal jurisdiction in the
exhaustion opinions stands in clear opposition to the presump-
tion articulated throughout an important line of Supreme Court
cases. Specifically, the Court's insistence in exhaustion cases that
"[clivil jurisdiction over [the activities of non-Indians on reserva-
tion lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts"'" appears to
be flatly inconsistent with the Court's earlier articulation of "the
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe."" 5 Whatever the proper construction of these two pre-
sumptions,'46 the resulting tension creates inconsistency and
uncertainty for the lower courts. Moreover, the exhaustion rule
itself contains an internal inconsistency: although its rhetoric
stresses commitment to tribal self-determination and self-govern-
ment," 7 its extremely broad definition of federal question juris-
diction, which allows review of every aspect of the tribal court's
adjudicatory jurisdiction, ensures extensive federal oversight of
tribal court adjudications. Finally, the Court's insistence in its
exhaustion cases that "[tlhe alleged incompetence of tribal courts
is not among the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement" 48
contrasts sharply with observations made in the context of state-
tribal court jurisdictional disputes. Consider the Court's holdings
quois and New York: An Analysis of 25 U.S.C. §§ 232, 233, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
497, 565 (1990).
144. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18.
145. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
146. See discussion infra Part III. For more extensive analysis of this issue, see
Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While
Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1128-30, 1141-52 (1995) there-
inafter Reynolds, Exhaustion], and Laurie Reynolds, 'Jurisdiction' in Federal Indian
Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme Court Precedent (forthcoming in N.M. L.
REV. (1997)) [hereinafter Reynolds, Jurisdiction].
147. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 14 ("We have repeatedly recognized the Federal
Government's longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-government."); see also
National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856
(1985) ("Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of
supporting tribal self-government and self-determination.").
148. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19.
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in the Wold cases, in which it ordered the state court to adjudi-
cate a lawsuit filed by an Indian tribe, even though that same
dispute, if initiated by a non-Indian plaintiff, would be within the
sphere of exclusive tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction under
Williams.49 In those cases, the Court mentioned the lack of a
meaningful tribal forum as one of the important practical reasons
for requiring state court adjudication. 5 ' Taken together, the
two lines of cases cast substantial doubt on the relevance of a
nontribal court's determination whether the tribal court meets
some undefined standard of competency before the non-Indian
court must relinquish adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Whether the exhaustion doctrine is the dark cloud over tribal
sovereignty that some writers have argued,'5' or the silver lin-
ing of new and expansive opportunities for initial tribal court
adjudication,'52 the fact remains that as a rule of jurisdictional
149. See supra notes 28-86 and accompanying text.
150. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 883 (1986) (Wold II)
(describing the pending lawsuit between a tribal plaintiff and a non-Indian defendant
as one "for which there is no other forum"); id. at 889 (noting that "the Tribe can-
not be said to have a meaningful alternative to state adjudication"); Three Affiliated
Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 149 (1984) (Wold 1) (emphasizing that state ad-
judication of a claim arising on Indian country is "particularly compatible with tribal
autonomy when, as here, the suit is brought by the tribe itself and the tribal court
lacked jurisdiction over the claim at the time the suit was instituted").
151. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 3, 20 (criticizing extension of federal plenary power over tribal court
decision making, while recognizing that the exhaustion doctrine "at least preserves
the civil jurisdictional integrity of tribal courts"); Clinton, supra note 105, at 150-51
(describing the exhaustion doctrine as "the ultimate colonialist distrust of leaving the
final resolution of [causes of action arising on reservations] to tribal governance");
Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
841, 879-80 (1990) [hereinafter Clinton, Tribal Courts] ("[Creating a judicially de-
fined exhaustion doctrine to afford some federal court review seemingly ignores tra-
ditional rules of finality applicable to the judgments of sovereigns. . ."); Reynolds,
Exhaustion, supra note 146, at 1134-49 ("Although the most frequently stated justifi-
cation for tribal exhaustion is to effectuate Congress's strong commitment to tribal
sovereignty, careful analysis of the Supreme Court's opinions ... reveals that the
reality falls far short of that ideal.") (footnote omitted).
152. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 38, at 1234 (describing the exhaustion doctrine
as a pragmatic accommodation between "Anglo-American procedural and substantive
values" and "Indian traditions of dispute resolution"); Timothy W. Joranko, Exhaus-
tion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutua. Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by the Federal Judicial
System, 78 MINN. L. REv. 259, 286-93 (1993) (arguing for expansive application of
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allocation, the tribal exhaustion doctrine is vaguely defined and
confusingly inconsistent. It establishes a new set of rules for
federal courts to follow, ignoring long-standing Supreme Court
precedent that addresses the scope of tribal court adjudicatory
jurisdiction from the perspective of state court encroachment.
Most fundamentally, the exhaustion rule requires federal courts
to refer many lawsuits to tribal court, even though an identical
dispute would be subject to state court jurisdiction under Wil-
liams.15 Rules of tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction should
depend upon a theory of tribal court jurisdiction, not on whether
a litigant files a lawsuit in federal or state court.
C. Tribal Court Adjudicatory Jurisdiction As Seen Through
Nontribal Judicial Lenses
The wide variation among tribal courts precludes broad gener-
alizations about their level of formal organization,' 54 the extent
the exhaustion doctrine); Pommersheim, Crucible, supra note 19, at 329 (endorsing
the rules of tribal exhaustion as a necessary means to "curb the most prevalent at-
tempts to undermine and circumvent tribal court jurisdiction"); Pommersheim, Liber-
ation, supra note 19, at 412 (describing the exhaustion holdings as "seminal"); Judith
Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 671, 732 (1989) (describing the exhaustion rule as evidence of the Su-
preme Court's realization that federal jurisdiction would intrude improperly on tribal
sovereignty); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts' Jurisdictional
Determinations: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding and Respect Between Different
Cultural and Judicial Norms, 24 N.M. L. REV. 191, 193 (1994) (arguing for more
deferential postexhaustion review by federal courts); Michael Taylor, Modern Practice
in the Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 231, 273 (1987) (applauding the
exhaustion rule because it will enhance the competence of tribal courts).
153. See supra notes 28-46 and accompanying text; see also Reynolds, Exhaustion,
supra note 146, at 1136-37 (analyzing the tensions that exist between Williams and
the exhaustion doctrine).
154. For example, no California tribe has a functioning court, except for a few
small judicial offices that only deal with hunting and fishing regulations. See Indian
Tribal Justice Act: Hearing on S. 521 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs,
103d Cong. 148 (1993) [hereinafter Tribal Justice Hearings] (statement of Barbara
Gonzales-Lyons, Vice Chairman, Tribal Council, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla In-
dians). The Navajo Tribe, however, operates seven district trial courts, a family court
in each district, an appellate court, and a traditional Navajo Peacemaker Court. See
Indian Tribal Justice Act: Hearing on H.R. 1268 Before the Subcomm. on Native Am.
Affairs of the House Comm. on Natural Resources, 103d Cong. 84 (1993) (testimony
of the Honorable Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation). Moreover, the
Navajo tribe has a published code, case law reporter, and a bar association. See
568
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of their jurisdictional reach,155 or their independence from oth-
er tribal governmental bodies.156 Nevertheless, the rules of Wil-
liams, Wold, and National Farmers Union, imposed from the
outside to determine the scope of tribal court adjudication, apply
to all tribal courts. Not surprisingly, perhaps, these allocational
rules have in turn led to additional external formulations of the
scope of tribal adjudicatory power. Unfortunately, these non-In-
dian evaluations unnecessarily restrict tribal determinations of
the scope of their own jurisdiction.
A 1934 opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Inte-
rior asserted that "the judicial powers of the tribe are coexten-
sive with its legislative or executive powers." 7 During the
time of incipient tribal court development, perhaps that state-
Tribal Courts Act of 1991 and Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Enti-
tled 'Indian Civil Rights Act": Hearings Before the Senate Select Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs, 102d Cong. 232 (1991). Although many tribal courts are organized pursuant
to the Indian Reorganization Act, some tribes, such as the Navajo and the Laguna
Pueblo, as well as some Alaska villages and Minnesota tribes, maintain traditional
justice systems. See H.R. REP. No. 103-205, at 7 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2425, 2427. For a comprehensive summary of the historical develop-
ment of tribal courts, see POMMEWSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS supra note 19, at 61-
65; Margery H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing
the Development of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 216-25 (1991);
Taylor, supra note 152, at 235-38; Valencia-Weber, supra note 19, at 232-37.
155. The model ordinances provided to the tribes by the Department of the Interior
under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994), provided for tribal
court adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers only with that individual's consent.
See Vetter, supra note 34, at 186 n.102. Increasingly, tribal code provisions establish
tribal court jurisdiction over all individuals within the borders of the reservation, re-
gardless of tribal affiliation. See id. at 186. For instance, the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribal Code currently provides:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising un-
der the Tribal Constitution, the customs or the laws of the Tribe, and to
any case in which the Tribe, a member of the Tribe, an Indian residing
on the Reservation or a corporation or entity owned in whole or in sub-
stantial part by any Indian shall be a party.
Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 644 (S.D. 1993) (quoting STANDING ROCK SIOUX
TRIBAL CODE § 1-107).
156. The structure of many tribal governments does not include Anglo-American
notions of separation of powers. Curiously, the responsibility for the notable absence
of this fundamental concept of government lies with the Department of the Interior,
which drafted model constitutions for the tribes. See Pommersheim, Path, supra note
19, at 396.
157. 55 I.D. 14, 56 (1934), reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 1 OPINIONS
OF THE SOLICITOR 445, 471 (n.d.).
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ment could be seen as an expansive view intended to allow the
development of a tribal court's jurisdiction to its fullest possible
reach.15 For a modern tribal court seeking to achieve parity
with its state court counterparts, however, the statement is pro-
foundly limiting; it necessarily implies that a tribal court cannot
adjudicate disputes unless the conduct involved in the dispute is
within the scope of the tribe's legislative powers.
Commentators'59  and the Supreme Court"o itself have
cited this proposition, seemingly approving its inherent limita-
tions without explaining its justification. Compounding the nega-
tive impact of this limitation, moreover, is the Court's currently
restrictive view of tribal legislative powers themselves. Under
the line of cases beginning with Montana v. United States,
6
'
the Court has articulated the "general proposition that the in-
herent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers of the tribe."'62 If this standard also
158. The issuance of the Solicitor's opinion coincided with the passage of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 383, ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
159. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian
Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479, 514 (1979); Pommersheim, Crucible, supra note 19, at
334-35.
160. In Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), the Supreme
Court observed almost casually that "[slince the Tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction was
coextensive with its legislative jurisdiction, the [tribal] court concluded that it would
have jurisdiction over the suit." Id. at 12. From the context of that statement, it is
unclear whether the Supreme Court believed that the two spheres of jurisdiction
must be coterminous, or whether its statement merely stated the facts of the partic-
ular case before it. Even more perplexing, though, was the Court's acceptance of the
Tribe's assertion of legislative jurisdiction over the conduct giving rise to the lawsuit.
See id. at 17-18. Given the Supreme Court's restrictive view of the scope of tribal
legislative jurisdiction in other opinions, it is extremely unlikely that the Tribe's sov-
ereign powers extend to the activities of non-Indian defendants on fee land within
the reservation. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
161. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
162. Id. at 565. In subsequent cases, the Court has reaffirmed this restrictive view
of tribal legislative powers. In South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), for
instance, the Court declared "the general rule that an Indian tribe's inherent sover-
eign powers do not extend to non-Indian activity." Id. at 687; see also County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
267 (1992) (stressing "the very narrow powers reserved to tribes over the conduct of
non-Indians within their reservations"); Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431 (plurality opinion
of White, J.) (suggesting that tribal legislative powers over non-Indians are limited
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applies to tribal adjudicatory powers, tribal courts will be left
with the power to adjudicate only those disputes to which tribal
substantive law applies.
In recent cases, two federal courts of appeals have expressly
adopted this restrictive approach to tribal adjudicatory power. In
A-1 Contractors v. Strate,'" the Eighth Circuit held that a trib-
al court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a personal injury law-
suit between non-Indians filed in tribal court and that arises out
of a traffic accident occurring on a state highway within the
exterior borders of the reservation. Notwithstanding the tribal
trial and appellate courts' opinions upholding adjudication of the
controversy pursuant to the tribe's jurisdictional code," the
Eight Circuit opinion reasoned that because the tribe could not
apply its substantive law to regulate the behavior of the non-
Indian parties, it was likewise powerless to adjudicate the re-
sulting lawsuit."l Several months later, the Ninth Circuit
squarely adopted the Eighth Circuit's holding and rationale."
At least one state supreme court 67 and one tribal court"
have applied the same analysis.
In contrast, several courts 6 ' and commentators 7. have ar-
gued that the scope of a tribal court's adjudicatory powers should
to instances in which the non-Indian activity has a "demonstrably serious" impact
that "imperil[s]" tribal sovereignty).
163. 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
164. See Fredericks v. Continental W. Ins. Co., 20 Ind. L. Rep. 6009, 6010 (N.
Plains Intertr. Ct. App. 1992).
165. Four judges joined vigorous dissents, writing three separate dissenting opin-
ions. See A-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d at 941 (Beam, J., dissenting); id. at 944 (Gibson,
J., dissenting); id. at 945 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
166. See Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996).
167. See Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638 (S.D. 1993).
168. See Lefevre v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 23 Ind. L. Rep. 6018
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct., Gaming Enter. Div. 1992).
169. See, e.g., In re Estate of Witko v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 23 Ind. L. Rep.
6104, 6112 (Rosebud Sioux S. Ct. 1996) (stating that Montana analysis should be
limited to questions of tribal legislative authority); Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Min-
ing Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1540 (10th Cir. 1995) (stressing that tribal
adjudicatory power is not subject to the narrow Montana limitations).
170. See Joseph William Singer, Publicity Rights and the Conflict of Laws: Tribal
Court Jurisdiction and the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REv. 1 (1996); Reynolds,
Exhaustion, supra note 146, at 1128-30, 1141-49. The argument is made more fully
in Reynolds, Jurisdiction, supra note 146.
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be determined by application of Iowa Mutual's presumption that
"[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the activities of non-Indians on reserva-
tion lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirma-
tively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute."
171
This more expansive approach to tribal adjudicatory powers
would remove existing impediments to the tribe's ability to re-
solve disputes arising on the reservation that involve Indians, or
otherwise implicate a valid tribal sovereign interest.
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to this
issue, 17 analysis of the exhaustion holdings in National Farm-
ers Union and Iowa Mutual implicitly confirms the Court's sup-
port of broad tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction. Not only does the
Court's presumption that "[clivil jurisdiction over [the activities
of non-Indians on reservation lands] ... lies in the tribal
courts"171 suggest a view of tribal court adjudicatory power
that extends far beyond the limited scope of tribal court legisla-
tive power articulated by the current Supreme Court, 74 the
actual facts of those cases involve controversies that occurred on
non-Indian land within the exterior borders of the reserva-
tion. 7 Because recent Court opinions suggest an almost auto-
matic presumption that those activities fall beyond the scope of
tribal legislative power, 76 tribal court adjudication of the dis-
putes presumably would require the application of nontribal law.
It seems unlikely that the Court would have based its expansive
doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies and its corollary of
presumptively broad tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction on factual
171. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
172. When this Article went to press, the Court had not yet issued its opinion in
A-1 Contractors v. Strate. See infra notes 204-34 and accompanying text.
173. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18.
174. In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the Court introduced the
"general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." Id. at 565.
175. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
847 (1985) (stating that an accident giving rise to the lawsuit occurred on state-
owned land within the borders of the reservation); Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 11
(noting merely that the accident arose on a highway running through a reservation).
176. In South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), the Court seemed to be
moving toward an automatic prohibition on tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian land
within the reservation, concluding that loss of ownership "implies the loss of regula-
tory jurisdiction over the use of the land by others." Id. at 689.
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disputes in which the Court ultimately intended to conclude that
the tribal courts were powerless to adjudicate.
Hints of a second limitation on the scope of tribal court adju-
dicatory jurisdiction have emerged in some state court evalua-
tions of the legitimacy of disputed tribal court adjudications. The
concept of "territorial jurisdiction," undoubtedly a crucial com-
ponent of tribal sovereign powers, 77 has been transformed by
non-Indian courts into a prerequisite for the exercise of tribal
court jurisdiction. For example, according to' the South Dakota
Supreme Court's analysis in Red Fox v. Hettich,75 tribal courts
are powerless to adjudicate disputes arising beyond the scope of
their territorial jurisdiction.'79 Although tribes may choose to
limit their adjudicatory jurisdiction to causes of action occurring
exclusively within their territory, tribal court assumption of the
power to adjudicate disputes with off-reservation contacts, for
177. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (describing, Indian
tribes as "unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory") (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 557, (1832)).
The Supreme Court also has emphasized the territorial component of tribal sover-
eignty in other contexts, noting "the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control
economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing govern-
mental services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in
economic activities within that jurisdiction." Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199 (1824)).
178. 494 N.W.2d 638 (S.D. 1993).
179. Curiously, the court adopted the definition of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction
proposed by Professor Pommersheim. See Pommersheim, Crucible, supra note 19, at
335. Professor Pommershein argues that because the tribe's territorial jurisdiction
extends to include non-Indian land within the reservation, its adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion should expand to that same extent. See id. at 343-44. The South Dakota court,
however, offered the concept of "territorial jurisdiction" as a means of limiting tribal
court adjudicatory power. See Red Fox, 494 N.W.2d at 643. In Red Fox, the court
refused to enforce a tribal court judgment against a non-Indian defendant. See id. at
647. In the tribal court action, the Indian plaintiff sued the non-Indian for damages
suffered when the plaintiff struck the defendant's dead horse on a state highway
that traversed the reservation. See id. at 640.
In a related context, the Supreme Court twice has reserved judgment on the ques-
tion "whether the Tribe's right to self-governance could operate -independently of its
territorial jurisdiction to pre-empt [state law]." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox
Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 126 (1993); see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation,
115 S. Ct. 2214, 2223 (1995) (declining to address whether a state tax infringed on tribal
self-goverance). These statements suggest that a tribe's territorial jurisdiction may be
relevant to the scope of its legislative jurisdiction, but it is not necessarily relevant to the
determination of the boundaries of its adjudicatory jurisdiction.
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instance, does not appear to contravene any legitimate federal or
state concern about the scope of tribal power. 8 ' In fact, various
state courts have recognized concurrent tribal power to adjudi-
cate controversies arising outside the bounds of the tribe's ter-
ritory;'' to do otherwise would limit unnecessarily tribal court
adjudication to only those lawsuits falling within the tribal
court's sphere of exclusive jurisdiction as established by Wil-
liams and Fisher.
A final component of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction that has
been subjected to heightened scrutiny by nontribal courts is the
scope of the tribal court's personal jurisdiction. Both state and
federal courts have asserted, without clear doctrinal justifica-
tion, that establishing the personal jurisdiction of the tribal
courts "requires more in the way of minimum contacts than
would be sufficient for the citizen of one state to assert personal
jurisdiction over the citizen of another state."8 2 This pro-
nouncement stands in stark contrast to tribal court holdings of
personal jurisdiction over defendants who have established a
presence on the reservation that satisfies the Supreme Court's
minimum contact holdings."s
180. For instance, the tribal code quoted in State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 506
P.2d 786 (N.M. 1973), provided that the Navajo court had jurisdiction "over . . . [all
civil actions in which the defendant is an Indian and is found within its territorial
jurisdiction." Id. at 787 (quoting NAHON CODE tit. 7, § 133 (Equity n.d.))
Similarly, the tribal ordinance at issue in Twin City Construction Co. v. Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 911 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1990), provided that
the tribal court had adjudicatory jurisdiction over "[c]ontracts to be performed within
the Court's territorial jurisdiction, including contracts to insure any person, property
or risk, located within the Court's territorial jurisdiction." Id. at 139 (quoting TURTLE
MOUNTAIN TRIBAL CODE tit. 2, § 2.0102(1) (1987)). In the latter case, the tribe used
the concept of territorial jurisdiction to assert adjudicatory jurisdiction over transac-
tions that involved both on- and off-reservation contacts. Thus, territorial jurisdiction
is properly understood as a tool for tribal determination of the scope of its courts'
adjudicatory jurisdiction, not as a limitation imposed on tribal court adjudicatory
powers by nontribal courts.
181. See, e.g., In re Custody of K.K.S., 508 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994);
Anderson, 506 P.2d at 788; Lewis v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Okla. Hous. Auth., 896
P.2d 503, 509-10 (Okla. 1994); Wells v. Wells, 451 N.W.2d 402, 405 (S.D. 1990).
182. Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 519 F. Supp. 418, 431 (D. Ariz.
1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Babbitt, 710
F.2d at 598; Red Fox, 494 N.W.2d at 645 (recognizing the higher minimum contacts
standard necessary for assumption of personal jurisdiction by a tribal court).
183. See, e.g., Pommersheim, Crucible, supra note 19, at 341 (describing the Rose-
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The totality of the externally imposed limitations described
above produces the formula adopted by the South Dakota Su-
preme Court in Red Fox: tribal adjudicative authority = territo-
rial jurisdiction + subject matter jurisdiction + personal jurisdic-
tion + legislative jurisdiction.1" As an implementation of the
Supreme Court's ringing endorsement of tribal self-determina-
tion, the formula appears unnecessarily restrictive and unjustifi-
ably intrusive. Rather than focusing on the Court's effusive
praise of expansive tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction, the for-
mula superimposed the Court's more restrictive view of tribal
legislative jurisdiction, producing a narrowly defined realm of
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction. In so doing, the South Dakota
Supreme Court ignored the important sovereign tribal interests
of establishing a judicial forum with the same range of adjudica-
tory authority as non-Indian courts.
As tribal courts continue to expand the reach of their jurisdic-
tional ordinances,1" challenges to the parameters of the vari-
ous components of tribal court adjudicatory power increasingly
will be brought by those seeking to avoid tribal court adjudica-
tion. With but a few hints on which to rely, non-Indian courts
should respect the Supreme Court's implicit confirmation of
broad tribal court adjudicatory power and recognize that tribal
courts, just like their state and federal counterparts, are perfect-
ly competent to adjudicate disputes that fall outside the bounds
of their sovereign legislative and territorial jurisdiction. '
D. The Gapfillers
Not infrequently, application of one of the rules described
above will yield a gap in jurisdictional competence. For instance,
bud Sioux Tribal Courfes application of the Supreme Court's doctrine of minimum
contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant).
184. See Red Fox, 494 N.W.2d at 642 n.4.
185. A typical modem tribal ordinance grants the tribal court jurisdiction over all
causes of action "which arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the [tribe],
or which arise within the jurisdiction of the [tribe], or in any transitory action when
the defendant may be served within the jurisdiction of the [tribe]." Cole v. Kaw
Hous. Auth., 22 Ind. L. Rep. 6092, 6094 (Kaw D. Ct. 1995) (citing KAW NATION LAW
AND ORDER CODE ch. VI, § 1).
186. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
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although application of the Supreme Court's exhaustion rules
would suggest that initial dispute resolution should take place
in a tribal court, a tribal court may not exist or, if one does, it
may not have jurisdiction over the pending lawsuit. These gaps,
known as the "no forum" or the "no law" problem, 187 place non-
Indian courts in the difficult situation of having to choose be-
tween, on the one hand, a faithful application of precedent that
will ultimately deprive the parties of judicial relief or, on the
other hand, a pragmatic determination that the provision of a
forum for dispute resolution must take precedence over the ap-
plication of the jurisdictional rules.
Both state and federal courts have confronted this problem,
and generalizations are difficult to glean. Some courts steadfast-
ly refuse to alter their analysis of adjudicatory jurisdiction even
when confronted with the possibility that no alternative forum
exists." For those courts, non-Indian adjudication of the dis-
pute would constitute an impermissible infringement on tribal
sovereignty.18 Moreover, in their analysis, the courts stress
that the Supreme Court's guiding rules admit of no exception for
gap-filling functions." ° Although perhaps expressing concern
for the possibility that meritorious claims will not be vindicated
in a judicial forum, the courts reluctantly conclude that the
weight of precedent allows for no other decision."9 '
187. For an overview of the "no forum" dilemma, see Pommersheim, Crucible, supra
note 19, at 347-55; Jean Pendleton, Note, Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante
and Diversity Jurisdiction in Indian Country: What If No Forum Exists?, 33 S.D. L.
REV. 528 (1988).
188. See, e.g., Northwest S.D. Prods. Credit Ass'n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.
1986); Neadeau v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. C7-93-691, 1993 WL 302127
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1993); Chino v. Chino, 561 P.2d 476 (N.M. 1977); Nelson v.
Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975).
189. See Neadeau, 1993 WL 302127, at *1 ("To assert jurisdiction in this matter
where none has been conferred to the state by Congress would undermine the
[tribe's] right of self-governance . . ").
190. See Nelson, 232 N.W.2d at 58-59 ("Federal courts will not accept jurisdiction
unless the statutory bases for federal jurisdiction are present."). In some sense, how-
ever, the Court's opinions in Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S.
877 (1986) (Wold I); 467 U.S. 138 (1984) (Wold 1), endorse the gap-filling function
served by nontribal courts when no tribal forum exists. See supra notes 72-84 and
accompanying text; see also Wold II, 476 U.S. at 883 (requiring state court adjudica-
tion of litigation "for which there is no other forum"); id. at 889 (noting that the
Tribe had no "meaningful alternative to state adjudication").
191. In Nelson, 232 N.W.2d at 58, for example, the court held that its state courts
576 [Vol. 38:539
ADJUDICATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
In contrast, other courts that face this dilemma -choose to as-
sume adjudicatory jurisdiction. For these courts, the choice be-
tween "acknowledging a 'zone of civil lawlessness' or allowing
[non-Indian courts] to 'interstitially' fill in the gaps""' is guid-
ed by the overriding importance of the availability of judicial re-
view for lawsuits grounded properly in common law or statutory
provisions.93 Moreover, these courts conclude that tribal sover-
eignty cannot be infringed by non-Indian adjudication of a dis-
pute that would otherwise go unresolved.
If all of the current gaps in tribal court adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion could be attributed to a sovereign decision to deny or limit
relief, the argument that nontribal court gap-filling infringes on
tribal sovereignty would be more compelling." The reality,
however, is frequently otherwise. Tribal ordinances may limit
their courts' adjudicatory jurisdiction to cases involving only
consenting non-Indian defendants, not because the tribe has
concluded that lawsuits against other non-Indians are not meri-
torious, but rather because the tribe's ordinance dates from the
days of the Indian Reorganization Act and thus follows the mod-
el provided by the Department of the Interior.' Similarly, the
lack of a formal tribal court system is usually due to inadequate
resources and expertise, rather than to a tribal legislative deci-
sion that judicial remedies should be unavailable.'96 In con-
trast, a tribal law that denies or limits pain and suffering dam-
ages in personal injury lawsuits clearly does reflect a reasoned
governmental decision about the availability of certain types of
were without jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit but noted that the holding would prob-
ably leave the plaintiffs "without a forum in which to redress their injuries." But see
id. at 59-61 (Vogel, J., dissenting).
192. Richardson v. Malone, 762 F. Supp. 1463, 1469 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
193. See Federal Land Bank v. Burris, 790 P.2d 534, 537 (Okla. 1990) (emphasizing
that statutes become meaningless if no forum exists in which to adjudicate disputes
based on those statutes).
194. Professor Pommersheim has urged that "[firom the point of view of tribal sov-
ereignty and tribal self-determination," nontribal courts should not assume a gap-fill-
ing function. Pommersheim, Crucible, supra note 19, at 353.
195. See infra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
196. For example, in Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1475 n.11
(9th Cir. 1989), the Tribe had no tribal courts when the federal lawsuit was initiat-
ed. By the time the Ninth Circuit heard the case, however, the tribe had authorized
the creation of a tribal court system. See id.
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relief for activities within the tribe's legislative competence."
For the nontribal court, then, the decision whether to supply
state or federal law to fill in the gaps of tribal jurisdiction may
raise serious questions about infringement of tribal sovereign
prerogatives. Some of these courts, however, decide to adjudicate
a controversy that might otherwise be beyond their jurisdictional
reach simply because tribal adjudication, although preferable, is
unavailable. As tribal courts continue to expand their adjudica-
tory jurisdiction, the realities of this analysis are likely to
change. To retain validity and persuasiveness, the gapfillers,
like all other allocational rules, must factor into the analysis
the realities of tribal court adjudicatory competence.
E. Summary
Viewed in their totality, the rules that currently allocate adju-
dicatory jurisdiction among state, federal, and tribal courts rep-
resent an accumulation of case holdings spanning almost forty
years beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Williams.
Unfortunately, however, the cases do not blend together to form
a consistent whole. In fact, they create an almost daunting set of
inconsistencies: internal inconsistencies;19 inconsistencies be-
197. The Mashantucket Pequots of Connecticut, for example, have adopted a law
limiting pain and suffering damages to 50% of actual damages. Tribal judges will
apply this law to negligence lawsuits that are filed in tribal courts. See Indian Af
fairs: How Law Is Born, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1995, at 27-28.
198. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), for example, the Court invalidated
state court jurisdiction over suits brought by non-Indians against Indians for on-res-
ervation causes of action because non-Indian adjudication would infringe
impermissibly on tribal sovereignty. See id. at 223. What the opinion failed to rec-
ognize, however, was that the same tribal sovereign interest would be infringed if
the Indian party initiated the lawsuit in the same situation. Instead, the Court
stressed in Williams that state courts properly have assumed jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate lawsuits filed by Indian plaintiffs. See id. at 219. In fact, the Court described
the cases brought by Indian plaintiffs as examples of situations in which "essential
tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeop-
ardized." Id.; see supra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's recently articulated rule of exhaustion of tribal
remedies stressed tribal sovereignty in its rhetoric: "We have repeatedly recognized
the Federal Government's longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-government."
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987); see also National Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985) ("Our cases have
often recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-gov-
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tween different rules of adjudicatory jurisdiction; " and incon-
sistencies with other general Indian jurisdictional rules. 0 Al-
though consistency, symmetry, and uniformity have never been
highly valued in the constantly changing field of Indian law,
20 1
emiment and self-determination.m"). Notwithstanding the vigorous use of pro-tribal
sovereignty language, however, the holdings created a stunningly broad definition of
federal question jurisdiction to review tribal court holdings. See supra notes 106-52
and accompanying text.
199. In their application to a particular dispute, the Supreme Court's rules may be
flatly inconsistent with one another. Compare, for instance, the sphere of adjudicato-
ry jurisdiction left .to the states in the wake of Williams with the scope of initial
federal court adjudication established by the exhaustion rules. In the state court cas-
es, Williams does not preclude state court adjudication of many lawsuits involving
Indians if substantial off-reservation contacts are present. See Williams, 358 U.S. at
223; supra note 46 and accompanying text. If a similar dispute should make its way
into federal court, either through application of the diversity statute, or on the basis
of federal question jurisdiction, the tribal exhaustion doctrine dictates that the feder-
al court defer to preliminary tribal court adjudication. Thus, the availability of
nontribal adjudication will frequently depend on whether the plaintiff files in a state
or federal court. See supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text.
A second inconsistency is suggested by comparing the Wold cases with the
breadth of the exhaustion doctrine. In Wold II, the Court emphasized the lack of a
"meaningful" tribal forum as one of the important reasons for requiring state court
adjudication. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 888 (1986)
(Weld II). With that statement, the Court suggested that non-Indian courts may
assess whether the tribal court meets some undefined standards of competency be-
fore relinquishing adjudicatory jurisdiction. In contrast, the Court's exhaustion hold-
ings specifically remove that question from the scope of judicial analysis: "The al-
leged incompetence of tribal courts is not among the exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement .... Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19; see supra notes 134-36 and accom-
panying text.
200. Specifically, the current rules diverge from the Courts apparent recognition of
a growing concurrent jurisdiction in Indian country, see Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (noting that "states and tribes have concur-
rent jurisdiction over the same territory"), and the presumption that generally re-
stricts tribal sovereign power to its territorial base. See supra notes 134-36 and
accompanying text.
Moreover, the judicially created presumption guiding the development of tribal
court adjudicatory jurisdiction stands in sharp contrast to the presumption applied to
resolve disputes involving all other aspects of tribal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
simply has refused to distinguish adjudicatory jurisdiction from legislative jurisdic-
tion, and its cases articulate two irreconcilable presumptions. See infra notes 209-29
and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 38, at 1201-03, 1235-38. In that article, Professor
Frickey criticized Justice Stevens for favoring uniformity of legal rules over practical
legal reasoning in Indian law cases. See id. at 1235. For Professor Frickey, symme-
try and uniformity are poor substitutes for the "critical perspective, tradition, and
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the current application of the rules presents a package that is
held together only by its stated commitment to tribal sovereignty
as the guiding principle. So long as the Supreme Court, in the
absence of congressional action, continues to build on the existing
identity-based rules without crafting an overall vision of the
scope of tribal court adjudicatory power, the lines dividing the
spheres of tribal, federal, and state court jurisdiction will present
unsatisfactory and unresolved contradictions and inconsistencies.
III. IMPEDIMENTS TO A COHERENT THEORY OF TRIBAL COURT
ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION
A. The Supreme Court's Refusal To Distinguish Adjudicatoy
Jurisdiction.2 from Legislative Jurisdiction0 3
Although the Supreme Court has stated clearly that the scope
of tribal court subject matter jurisdiction is itself a federal ques-
contextual and institutional sensitivity" that infuse practical reasoning. Id. According
to Professor Frickey, Justice Stevens's adoption of "the Anglo-American
preunderstanding of legal uniformity in [Indian law] is especially troubling." Id. at
1237.
202. Adjudicatory or judicial jurisdiction is defined as "the power of a state to try a
particular action in its courts." McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578,
581 n.3 (8th Cir.) (emphasis ommitted), affd, 454 U.S. 1071 (1981); see also
Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274, 1284 n.18 (5th Cir.)
(distinguishing legislative jurisdiction from judicial jurisdiction), cert. granted, 474
U.S. 816 (1985), reu'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 207 (1986); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 707 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICTS § 377 cmt. a, which notes that [e]ach state has legislative
jurisdiction [i.e., power] to determine the legal effect of facts done or events caused
within its territory"). Justice Scalia, dissenting in part in Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), stressed that legislative jurisdiction refers to
"'the authority of a state to make its law applicable to persons or activities,' and is
quite a separate matter from jurisdiction to adjudicate.'" Id. at 813 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting in part) (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 231 (1987)).
Although the term "adjudicatory jurisdiction" is more common, some use "judi-
cial jurisdiction," see POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 19, at 83, or
"adjudicative jurisdiction," see Singer, supra note 170, at 27. Adjudicatory jurisdiction
is comprised of several component parts: the court must have personal jurisdiction
over the parties as well as subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. See id.
at 26.
203. Legislative or regulatory jurisdiction refers to "the power of a state to apply
its law to create or affect legal interests." Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (1978).
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tion under the federal jurisdictional statutes,"4 its substantive
pronouncements on the general question of tribal jurisdiction
have been imprecise and even contradictory. In fact, in two sets
of important federal Indian law cases involving challenges to
different aspects of tribal jurisdiction, the Court has articulated
two very different presumptions about the legitimacy of the trib-
al powers at issue. In the first line of cases, beginning with
Montana v. United States,"5 the Court held that a tribe could
not apply its ordinance to regulate the hunting and fishing ac-
tivities of nonmembers within the borders of the reservation on
land owned in fee by nonmembers.2 " To explain the lack of
tribal sovereign power, the Court established "the general propo-
sition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do
not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."20 7 Sub-
sequent cases have reiterated and strengthened Montana's pre-
sumption of divested sovereign power. In Brendale v. Confeder-
204. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indiana, 471 U.S. 845,
852 (1985); supra note 119 and accompanying text.
205. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
206. See id. at 564-67. The presence of land owned in fee by non-Indians within
the borders of many Indian reservations results from the federal government's nine-
teenth-century attempt to break up reservations. See FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S.
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 612-13 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
1982). Under the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.), Congress authorized the transfer of land
from the tribes to individual Indians, and opened the remaining surplus lands to
white settlers. See COHEN, supra, at 613. By the time that the allotment policy was
formally repudiated in 1934 with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act, Pub.
L. No. 383, ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
461-479 (1994)), huge amounts of tribal land had passed to non-Indian ownership.
See COHEN, supra, at 614. One noted authority has estimated that tribal land losses
totaled almost 90 million acres. See id. For an excellent review of allotment policy
and the negative effects that statute continues to have on tribal sovereignty and
self-determination, see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1 (1995).
207. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. Although the Court denied the exercise of tribal
sovereign power in this instance, the opinion suggested the possibility that the tribes
could regulate non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation if the activity sought
to be regulated "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 566. In addition, the
Court affirmed the inherent power of tribes to "regulate, through taxation, licensing,
or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or oth-
er arrangements." Id. at 565.
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ated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,"' Justice
White's plurality opinion denied tribal zoning authority over fee
land within the opened portion of the reservation, stating the
"governing principle.., that the tribe has no authority itself...
to regulate the use of fee land." 9 More recently, in South Da-
kota v. Bourland,210 the Court seemed to be moving toward a
nearly automatic prohibition of the exercise of tribal power over
non-Indian land within the reservation, concluding that loss of
ownership "implies the loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the
use of the land by others.""' For the current Supreme Court,
then, tribal sovereignty will rarely include the ability to regulate
non-Indian conduct on lands within the borders of the reserva-
tion that are owned in fee by non-Indians.
212
In contrast to Montana's extremely restrictive view of tribal
regulatory power, two contemporaneous Supreme Court decisions
articulated a broad presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. The Court's important tribal exhaustion decisions,
National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indi-
ans213 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,214 upheld
the power of a tribal court to adjudicate a controversy brought be-
fore it, even though the disputes involved non-Indian conduct on
non-Indian land within the reservation. Ignoring the Montana
Court's presumption of divested tribal jurisdiction in precisely
those circumstances, the Court stated in Iowa Mutual: "Civil
jurisdiction over [the activities of non-Indians on reservation
lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute."215
208. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
209. Id. at 430.
210. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
211. Id. at 689.
212. As Professor Robert Laurence recently noted, cases like Bourland actually in-
volve a judicial determination of reservation diminishment. See Robert Laurence, The
Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by Judicial, As Opposed to Legislative,
Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L.
REV. 393, 394 (1995). The power to diminish or to terminate a reservation, Professor
Laurence emphasized, lies with Congress, not with the Court. See id.
213. 471 U.S. 845 (1986); see supra notes 106-53 and accompanying text.
214. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
215. Id. at 18.
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Although the presumptions articulated in the two sets of cases
are facially inconsistent, they can be reconciled by identifying
more precisely the jurisdictional question involved. Montana,
Brendale, and Bourland all involved challenges to the tribe's
regulatory or legislative jurisdiction.21 National Farmers Union
and Iowa Mutual, in contrast, were disputes over the tribal
court's adjudicatory jurisdiction.217 The Court's failure to distin-
guish legislative jurisdiction from adjudicatory jurisdiction has
unnecessarily confused and obscured the relevant inquiries, mak-
ing the search for a coherent theory of tribal court adjudicatory
power more difficult."'
In fairness to the Supreme Court, however, the recent confu-
sion between legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction is but a
continuation of a long series of Indian law opinions in which the
Court has dealt with various tribal jurisdictional issues without
clarifying the type of jurisdiction at issue. Since the days of
Worcester v. Georgia,"9 the Court has used the term "jurisdic-
tion" to refer alternatively to the power of a government to regu-
late behavior"0 and to the power of a court to adjudicate a con-
troversy.22 In fact, the Court's opinion in Williams, the first
216. See Bourland, 508 U.S. at 681; Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 414 (1989); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
217. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 11-12; National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 847.
218. In its opinion in the National Farmers Union case, the Ninth Circuit distin-
guished legislative jurisdiction from adjudicatory jurisdiction, stating the unremark-
able proposition that c]ases are commonly adjudicated in forums that would lack
the authority to regulate the subject matter of the disputes." National Farmers Un-
ion Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320, 1322 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). The Supreme Court, however, implicitly rejected the
court's observation and chose instead to position the National Farmers Union debate
within the general issue of the scope of tribal power over non-Indians. See National
Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 853-56 (distinguishing only between civil and criminal
jurisdiction); supra notes 202-03.
219. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
220. The Court in Worcester stated: "ITMhe very passage of this act is an assertion
of jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation, and of the rights and powers consequent on
jurisdiction.' I&L at 542.
221. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), for example, the Court refused to
allow the state court to adjudicate a controversy involving Indian defendants and
arising out of an on-reservation transaction, stating that "to allow the exercise of
state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reser-
vation affairs." I& at 223.
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modern case to articulate the scope of the exclusive adjudicatory
jurisdiction of tribal courts, itself relied upon legislative jurisdic-
tion cases22 and was subsequently quoted by the Court in later
legislative jurisdiction cases."
Careful reading of recent Supreme Court decisions, however,
suggests that the Court is becoming increasingly aware that is-
sues of tribal legislative jurisdiction should be subject to different
guiding principles than issues of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction.
For example, in Iowa Mutual, the Court for the first time in an
Indian law opinion made the distinction between the two types of
jurisdiction by noting that the Blackfeet Tribe's "adjudicative
jurisdiction was coextensive with its legislative jurisdiction."'
Subsequently, in a dispute involving the scope of tribal court sov-
ereign power to regulate land use on fee lands located within the
reservation, Justice Blackmun's opinion for three members of the
Court noted that the adjudicatory jurisdiction cases were not
relevant because they involved "the issue of jurisdiction over a
civil suit brought against a non-Indian arising from a tort occur-
ring on reservation land."22 More recently, in Bourland, a case
222. The essential basis of Williams was the Worcester principle that state jurisdic-
tion does not extend into Indian country. See id. at 218-19.
223. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973),
for example, the Court invalidated the application of Arizona's income tax to incomes
earned from reservation sources by Indians residing on the reservation. It refused to
apply Williams to the dispute, not because it concluded that Williams's relevance
was limited to disputes involving adjudicatory jurisdiction, but because it concluded
that "cases applying the Williams test have dealt principally with situations involv-
ing non-Indians." Id. at 179; see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564
(1981) (citing Williams for the proposition that the "exercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without
express congressional delegation").
224. Iowa Mut. Ins. Cos. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 12 (1987). In reality, the Court's
observation is perplexing, especially in light of its Montana presumptions. Because
the school in Iowa Mutual was located on nonreservation land owned in fee but
within the borders of the reservation, Montana's presumption against tribal regulato-
ry jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands made it extremely unlikely that tribal
law would apply to resolve this dispute. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65. The
Court's assertion that the tribe's adjudicatory powers were coextensive with its regu-
latory powers, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the tribal court would be un-
able to adjudicate this lawsuit. It seems unlikely that the Court would have ordered
exhaustion of tribal remedies if it were already aware of the tribe's inability to adju-
dicate the dispute. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18-19.
225. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
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in which the Court concluded that loss of tribal ownership of
lands within the reservation resulted in a concomitant loss of
tribal regulatory jurisdiction over those lands,"' the Court care-
fully and repeatedly stressed that the case involved a challenge to
the tribe's "regulatory jurisdiction,"27 "regulatory control,"2r
or "regulatory authority," 9 thus suggesting that the general
term "jurisdiction" may no longer suffice to describe these multi-
faceted disputes.
Until the Supreme Court more clearly establishes the distinc-
tion between legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction, the lower
courts are left with the difficult task of reconciling conflicting
presumptions about the scope of tribal powers. In fact, two federal
courts of appeals have applied the Montana Court's presumptive
divestment of tribal sovereignty to disputes involving the scope of
tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction," ° thus ignoring Iowa
Mutual's assertion that tribal courts are presumed to have adjudi-
catory jurisdiction over suits involving non-Indians on the reser-
vation." 1 One recent federal district court opinion, however,
refused to apply the Montana test to determine the scope of the
tribal court's power to adjudicate a controversy before it. 2
Rather, the court concluded that "Montana should be applied only
to determine ultimately the validity of the [tribal law] itself," and
not to determine conflicting assertions of "tribal court [adjudica-
tory] jurisdiction over the dispute.""5 A coherent allocation of
tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction, consistent with Iowa
Mutual's endorsement of tribal adjudicatory power that extends
U.S. 408, 455 n.5 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice White's opinion in Brendale con-
cluded that the protribal presumption of jurisdiction articulated in National Farmers
Union and Iowa Mutual was not relevant to the issue of retained tribal sovereign
regulatory power. See id. at 427 n.10.
226. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993).
227. Id. at 685 n.6, 689, 691 n.12, 695.
228. Id. at 691, 692, 695, 696.
229. Id. at 686, 687 n.8, 691 n.11, 692 n.13, 693; 694.
230. See Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996); A-1 Contrac-
tors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); supra notes
163-67 and accompanying text.
231. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 18 (1987).
232. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Navajo Nation, 866 F. Supp. 506 (D.N.M. 1994).
233. Id. at 509-10.
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beyond the limited scope of tribal legislative jurisdiction, will
require clearer Supreme Court guidance and explicit bifurcation
of the jurisdiction cases.'
B. Extensive Variation Among Tribal Courts
The diversity of tribal courts presents a second serious stum-
bling block to the articulation and refinement of uniform rules of
tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction. Although some tribal courts
have adopted wide-ranging jurisdictional codes and provide a fair
and efficient forum for members and nonmembers alike, others
exercise extremely limited adjudicatory jurisdiction and are some-
times staffed with individuals having no formal legal train-
ing. 5 A brief review of the development of tribal courts will
facilitate an understanding of the current situation. The federal
government did not concern itself with tribal justice until the
1880s,"6 when the Secretary of the Interior authorized the es-
tablishment of the Courts of Indian Offenses on any reservation
approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the appropri-
ate Indian Agent. 7 Despite the lack of statutory authoriza-
tion,"5 these Indian courts (frequently referred to as "CFR
courts" in reference to the federal regulations that guide their
operations) 9 exercised sweeping jurisdiction in their efforts to
maintain law and order on the reservation and promote "accul-
turation and assimilation." '
Years later, with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
(IRA)24' and a newfound federal commitment to tribal sovereign
234. That issue is currently before the Supreme Court. See A-1 Contractors, 117 S.
Ct. 37 (1996); see also supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
235. See Tribal Court Systems and Indian Civil Rights Act: Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 19-20 (1988) [hereinafter Civil
Rights Act Hearings] (statement of Donald D. Dupuis, President, National American
Court Judges Association).
236. See H.R. REP. No. 103-205, at 6 (1993).
237. See Pommersheim, Contextual Legitimacy, supra note 19, at 53.
238. See id. at 51.
239. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 19, at 235.
240. Id. at 52; see WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 109-10 (1966)
(describing the jurisdiction of the Courts of Indian Offenses); Valencia-Weber, supra
note 19, at 235-37 (summarizing the history of the Courts of Indian Offenses).
241. Pub. L. No. 383, ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
[Vol. 38:539586
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governments, Congress provided a statutory mechanism for the
establishment of tribal judicial systems that, unlike their CFR
predecessors, would be considered emanations of tribal, rather
than federal, sovereignty. u2 Despite the pro-tribal sovereignty
rhetoric, however, most of the tribes that chose to organize under
the IRA received prepackaged constitutions from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA). 3 These model constitutions had no ana-
logue to the Bill of Rights nor a provision ensuring separation of
powers in the tribal government.' As one commentator has
noted: "Not coincidentally perhaps, these very omissions are the
ones that tribes are most criticized for, when in fact the blame lies
elsewhere."245 Currently, approximately 150 tribal courts have
organized under the IRA and twenty-one CFR courts exist in the
United States." s A more limited number of tribes, such as the
Navajo, refused to organize under the IRA u7 and retained their
traditional tribal justice systems."
§§ 461-479 (1994)).
242. See POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 19, at 65-66; Brown &
Desmond, supra note 154, at 218-19; Pommersheim, Path, supra note 19, at 394-96.
Comparing tribal courts to CFR courts, one state supreme court justice described
CFR courts as "not ... created by an Indian sovereignty ... but... administra-
tively created within the structure of the United States." State ex rel. Peterson v.
District Court, 617 P.2d 1056, 1070 (Wyo. 1980) (Raper, C.J., specially concurring).
243. See COHEN, supra note 206, at 149-51; Resnik, supra note 152, at 712.
244. See Pommersheim, Path, supra note 19, at 396.
245. Id. In his article, Professor Pommersheim argues that until tribal governments
can revise their constitutions to incorporate important tribal values and "identify
other vital sources of law with which to shape the contours of tribal aspiration," id.
at 398, tribal constitutions will never "occupy within their own communities the
same high moral and legal ground as the United States Constitution holds in Amer-
ican legal and political culture." Id. at 397.
Another general provision imposed by the BIA has limited greatly the scope of
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction. The personal jurisdiction laws of many tribes narrow-
ly restrict tribal court adjudication of disputes involving non-Indians; for instance,
some tribes require that the defendant be a reservation resident, though others re-
quire the consent of a non-Indian defendant before assertion of adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion is permissible. See Pommersheim, Crucible, supra note 19, "at 338-39; Vetter,
supra note 34, at 186 & n.104.
246. See The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Jurisdiction in Indian Country:
Hearing on H.R. 972 Before the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 102d
Cong. 9 (1991) [hereinafter Duro Decision] (statement of Ronal D. Eden, Director,
Office of Tribal Services); Civil Rights Act Hearings, supra note 235, at 19.
247. See Clinton, supra note 105, at 128.
248. See H.R. REP. No. 103-205, at 7 (1993). Tribes and native villages in New
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Only relatively recently have increasing numbers of tribes
begun to take the destiny of their court system into their own
hands.249 The resulting spectrum is extremely diverse: some
tribes have no court system at all;25 some maintain their status
as pre-IRA, CFR courts;25' some operate under the BIA
boilerplate provisions; and some are forging ahead to shape
tribal court systems to provide efficient dispute resolution proce-
dures and reflect the needs of the community they serve.25
Mexico, Alaska, and Minnesota have maintained their traditional tribal forums for
resolution of personal disputes at the local level. See id.
249. See, e.g., Brown & Desmond, supra note 154, at 300-01 (describing the forma-
tion of an intertribal appellate court); id. at 288-89 (describing the increased scope of
exclusive tribal jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act); Pommersheim, Cru-
cible, supra note 19, at 346 n.125 (describing the amendment to a tribal constitution
that eliminated the requirement that all tribal ordinances be approved by the Secre-
tary of the Interior); Pommersheim, Path, supra note 19, at 397-98 (describing tribal
adoptions of Bill of Rights provisions and expanded assertion of inherent tribal au-
thority).
250. See, e.g., Richardson v. Malone, 762 F. Supp. 1463, 1464 (N.D. Okla. 1991)
(noting the absence of an Osage Indian tribal court); Johnson v. Chilkat Indian Vil-
lage, 457 F. Supp. 384, 388 (D. Alaska 1978) (noting the absence of a Tlingit tribal
court system at the time suit was filed). Tribes in California have only a few small
courts dealing with hunting and fishing issues. See Tribal Justice Hearings, supra
note 154, at 148.
251. The most recent count suggests that approximately 21 CFR courts operate in
the United States. See Duro Decision, supra note 246, at 9. Some tribes treat CFR
courts as "interim courts" until they can create their own judicial system. See Valen-
cia-Weber, supra note 19, at 236. In State ex rel. Peterson v. District Court, 617 P.2d
1056 (Wyo. 1980), Chief Justice Raper's concurring opinion highlighted his distress
that applicable Supreme Court precedent required the state court to relinquish juris-
diction over the pending lawsuit to the tribal CFR courts. See id. at 1070 (Raper,
C.J., specially concurring). He called CFR courts "inferior," "intolerable," and "crudely
constructed." Id. at 1070-72 (Raper, C.J., specially concurring).
252. See Resnik, supra note 152, at 712-14.
253. As examples of the "growing legitimacy of tribal courts," Professor
Pommersheim points to external and internal developments, such as
the increase of law-trained Indian people within many systems, tribal
and constitutional code revision, the nascent development of traditional
and customary law, and the continued recognition of tribal courts by the
U.S. Supreme Court as viable and important forums for resolution of res-
ervation-based claims involving both Indians and non-Indians.
POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 19, at 68 (citation omitted). For all
tribal courts, however, lack of adequate funding greatly constricts the range of possi-
ble improvements and enhancements. See Sandra Lee Nowack, So That You Will
Hear Us: A.Native American Leaders' Forum, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 551, 564-65
(1993) ("The biggest problem for tribal courts from the point of view of a judge is
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Despite the variation that exists among tribal courts and the
fact that some may be inadequate to meet the dispute resolution
needs of the parties before them, the Williams rule established a
core of exclusive tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction. Not-
withstanding state court grumbling and overt criticism, the Court
has remained steadfast in its pronouncements that state court
adjudication of many disputes involving Indians and occurring on
the reservation would infringe impermissibly on tribal sovereign
self-governance rights. 4 Underlying these decisions is perhaps
the unstated recognition that, unless the Court insists on a
sphere of exclusive tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction, the trib-
al courts never will emerge from the shadows cast by their more
powerful and more fully developed state and federal ana-
logues. 5 At the same time, however, the Court occasionally has
sacrificed its principled commitment to tribal sovereignty to the
reality that, in some cases, exclusive tribal court adjudicatory
jurisdiction simply is not a meaningful alternativeY6 Thus, the
the inadequate funding for court operation . .. because of inadequate funding by
federal and tribal governments . . . .") (statement of Tribal Judge Arvo Q.
Mikkanen). With the recent passage of the Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
3601-3631 (1994), Congress declared its commitment to greatly enhanced funding for
tribal courts and tribal justice systems. See id. § 3601(8). Reality, however, has fall-
en far short of aspiration. Although the statute promised nearly $60 million per year
in federal funding to go to tribal court systems, see id. § 3621, the budget included
only a $5 million appropriation for fiscal year 1996. See Department of the Interior
and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1996: Hearings on H.R. 1977
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 954 (1996)
(testimony of Ada Deer, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs).
254. See supra notes 39-44, 94 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 19, at 153 (noting
that "[the playing field [of state-tribal relationships] has never been level");
Laurence, supra note 37, at 619 (arguing that federal court protection of a core of
exclusive tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction is justified by the fact that "[tiribes have
been made weak because of past dealings with federal and state governments, which
often failed to meet modem standards of justice and fairness"). In fact, congressional
recognition of the pervasive encroachment of state adjudication of lawsuits involving
the adoption and custody of Indian children led to the passage of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994), which vests broad exclusive
adjudicatory jurisdiction in tribal courts. See id. § 1911(a). Under the Act, Congress
found that "the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child cus-
tody proceedings . . . have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of
Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communi-
ties and families." Id. § 1901(5).
256. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 889 (1986)
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Supreme Court's rules allocating adjudicatory jurisdiction have
struggled to walk the fine line between recognizing a sphere of ex-
clusive tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction and appreciating the
varying stages of development among those courts. As a result,
the framework of jurisdictional rules frequently seems illogical
and unpersuasive."
C. State Court Resistance to Exclusive Tribal Court Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction
Some of the Supreme Court's most important pronouncements
on the scope of adjudicatory jurisdiction in Indian country arose
in contexts that reveal both state court reluctance to defer to
tribal court jurisdiction and state court resistance to opening its
courthouse doors to Indian and tribal plaintiffs. 8 Although it is
perhaps accurate to point to state hostility toward Indian tribes
as a motivating force in the state court decisions, other factors are
undoubtedly at work as well. First and foremost, perhaps, is the
fact that state courts generally exercise extremely broad subject
matter jurisdiction concurrent with other state, federal, and even
international tribunals." 9 In the absence of a federal statute
ousting state court subject matter jurisdiction, the reach of that
jurisdiction is limited only by the state's own jurisdictional stat-
utes and federal constitutional principles.26 Moreover, in a dif-
ferent type of Indian jurisdictional dispute, the Supreme Court
sent a contrary message to states eager to assert jurisdiction over
(Wold II) (requiring a state court to adjudicate a lawsuit filed by a tribe against a
non-Indian and stressing the absence of a "meaningful [tribal] alternative"); id. at
883 (noting that the state must adjudicate a controversy "for which there is no other
forum"); see also supra notes 64-86 and accompanying text (discussing Wold I and
Wold II).
257. See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Wold II, 476 U.S. at 878; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959).
259. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990) (noting
that "state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to
adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States").
260. In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981), for instance, the
Court stressed the breadth of concurrent state and federal court subject matter juris-
diction. In that case, the Court began "with the presumption that state courts enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction" with federal courts. Id. at 478. Limits on the scope of state
court subject matter jurisdiction, the Court noted, are "governed in the first instance
by state laws." Id.
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Indian country when it noted that "[sitates and tribes have con-
current jurisdiction over the same territory."26' Thus, the rules
that deprive state courts of the power to adjudicate many routine
cases involving state residents and no question of federal law run
counter to the otherwise broad principles of plenary concurrent
state jurisdiction.
Consider, for instance, the facts of Williams, the Court's first
articulation of the principle of exclusive tribal court adjudication.
In that case, a non-Indian trader sued Indian defendants over a
debt allegedly arising from the on-reservation sale of goods.262
In holding that the state court had no power to adjudicate that
lawsuit, the Court created the anomalous situation that a state
court could not adjudicate a contract dispute involving state resi-
dents. As noted by the authors of a widely used Indian law case-
book, this result is unusual indeed: "Is there any place in the
world, other than Indian country, where Lee's contract could have
been executed and yet be beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of
the Arizona Superior Courts?"2 3
In addition, because the state court's adjudicatory jurisdiction
over lawsuits involving Indians appears to depend exclusively on
the identity of the parties, state courts are placed in the uncom-
fortable position of denying judicial access to non-Indian plaintiffs
while allowing Indian plaintiffs to file an identical lawsuit. In
these situations, the state courts must ignore their oft-repeated
commitment to full and equal access to state court forums. One
state court, reluctantly refusing to exercise adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion in a lawsuit involving an on-reservation dispute between an
Indian and a non-Indian, commented that "there is little state
courts can do to afford the equal protection of our law to both its
Indian and non-Indian citizens on civil matters arising within the
exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation."2
261. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
262. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 217-18.
263. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 3, at 576. Thus, it is not surprising that a state
court would characterize theories that would limit state court jurisdiction in lawsuits
involving Indians as an example of "excessive self-abnegation of power and a whole-
sale retreat from judicature." Lewis v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Okla. Hous. Auth., 896
P.2d 503, 509 (Okla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 476 (1995).
264. Security State Bank v. Pierre, 511 P.2d 325, 329 (Mont. 1973); see also
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Further state court resistance to the relinquishment of subject
matter jurisdiction in Indian law is attributable to some state
courts' perception that the rules protecting exclusive tribal court
adjudicatory jurisdiction may "shield[ ] Indians from obligations
incurred off the reservation." 5 Expressing a similar sentiment,
the Supreme Court of Montana refused to decline jurisdiction
over a lawsuit filed against an Indian who engaged in an off-res-
ervation transaction, noting that Indians "cannot violate [state]
laws and then retreat to the sanctuary of the reservation for pro-
tection."2" It is true that Indian litigants have successfully de-
feated state court jurisdiction by relying on Williams's protection
of exclusive tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction. This strategy,
however, is not limited to Indian litigants. A review of the rele-
vant case law reveals numerous non-Indian litigants who have
argued successfully that state court adjudication of a lawsuit
would violate those same principles of exclusive tribal court ju-
risdiction. 6 ' In none of those cases, however, did the state court
McCrea v. Busch, 524 P.2d 781, 782 (Mont. 1974) (lamenting the "inequitable legal
vacuum" created by Supreme Court decisions withdrawing state court adjudicatory
jurisdiction in many cases involving on-reservation disputes). Commentators have
described this attitude as a "well-intentioned spirit and a conventional judicial out-
look" motivated by a desire to provide a forum for all of its citizens, Indian and
non-Indian alike. Brown & Desmond, supra note 154, at 264. In cases involving In-
dian plaintiffs, however, the Montana Supreme Court has noted that "an Indian has
the same rights as are accorded any other person to invoke the jurisdiction of the
state courts to protect his rights in matters not affecting the federal government."
State ex reL. Iron Bear v. District Court, 512 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Mont. 1973).
265. State Sec., Inc. v. Anderson, 506 P.2d 786, 789 (N.M. 1973). The same court
later described the claim of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction as an attempt by the
party objecting to state court adjudication to "interpose his special status as an Indi-
an as a shield to protect him from obligations." Lonewolf v. Lonewolf, 657 P.2d 627,
629 (N.M. 1982) (quoting Natewa v. Natewa, 499 P.2d 691, 693 (N.M. 1972)).
266. Little Horn State Bank v. Stops, 555 P.2d 211, 214 (Mont. 1976). This senti-
ment is not limited to state courts. See Richardson v. Malone, 762 F. Supp. 1463,
1469 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
267. See, e.g., Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 720 P.2d 499 (Ariz.
1986) (en banc); Kuykendall v. Tim's Buick, Pontiac, GMC & Toyota, Inc., 719 P.2d
1081 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Neadeau v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. C7-93-
691, 1993 WL 302127 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1993); Foster v. Luce, 850 P.2d 1034
(N.M. Ct. App. 1993); Alexander v. Cook, 566 P.2d 846 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977). In
fact, the party objecting to state court jurisdiction in the Wold cases was a non-Indi-
an corporation. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986) (Wold
II); Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138 (1984) (Wold 1).
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chide the non-Indian party for attempting to "retreat to the sanc-
tuary of the reservation."2
State courts' resistance to rules denying them otherwise broad
subject matter jurisdiction also may be based on the fear that no
tribal forum exists or, if one does exist, that it will be inadequate
to protect the rights of the non-Indian litigant. In State ex rel.
Peterson v. District Court,"9 for instance, a concurring justice,
though recognizing that the conclusion of exclusive tribal court
jurisdiction was dictated by "the cold logic of the law,"27° never-
theless lamented the "intolerable features of the [tribal court] sys-
tem."
271
Commentators confirm a pervasive judicial distrust of tribal
272rcourt adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians. That dis-
trust may be fueled by the fact that tribal court judgments, re-
gardless of whether state or federal law forms the basis of their
opinions, generally are unreviewable by state courts.273
Whatever its source, this pervasive judicial resistance to broad
tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction has had a marked effect on
the development of rational jurisdictional rules. It has impeded
the evolution of a coherent allocation of adjudicatory jurisdiction
between state and tribal courts and has forced the Supreme Court
to assume the role of arbiter between the two competing tribu-
nals. Confronted with vigorous state court resistance to the effec-
tuation of Congress's strong commitment to the evolution of fuller
tribal court adjudicatory power, the Supreme Court's task has
been daunting indeed. Not surprisingly, the resulting rules are
fraught with inconsistencies.
268. Little Horn State Bank, 555 P.2d at 214.
269. 617 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1980).
270. Id at 1070 (Raper, C.J., specially concurring).
271. Id. (Raper, C.J., specially concurring)
272. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 105, at 141; Pommersheim, Crucible, supra note
19, at 356-60. In a similar vein, Professor Judith Resnik has noted that when the
rights of non-Indians are involved, judicial "interest in 'tribal sovereignty' wanes."
Resnik, supra note 152, at 755.
273. State courts, however, may freely. refuse to enforce tribal court judgments
against non-Indian defendants. See Laurence, supra note 37, at 648-73. At least one
state, New Mexico, appears to hold that tribal court decisions are entitled to full
faith and credit. See Jim v. CIT Fin. Serv. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975).
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V. A RETURN TO GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The rules articulated by the Supreme Court to delineate the
adjudicatory jurisdiction of state, federal, and tribal courts in
Indian country are individualized and disjointed, standing alone
better than coalesced. Although each rule may be applied easily
on an individual basis, reconciling the body ofjurisdictional law is
virtually impossible. The Court may not have intended to estab-
lish "magical alignment rules";274 however, both state and fed-
eral courts reduce their pronouncements on tribal court adjudi-
cation to a checklist that tallies the identities of the parties and
the number of off-reservation contacts.
The absence of a more principled judicial inquiry can be at-
tributed in part to the lower courts' resistance to rules that re-
quire them to relinquish their adjudicatory jurisdiction, especially
when the tribal courts to which they are forced to yield may be
considered poor substitutes. Ultimately, the Supreme Court, in
the absence of congressional action, must reinfuse the rules with
a broader vision of the parameters that should shape tribal court
adjudicatory power. At the same time, the Court must be sensi-
tive to "what is, after all, an ongoing relationship"27 ' between
tribal and non-Indian governments, a relationship marked by
continual and often rapid changes from within tribal court sys-
tems.2 76
The rules of adjudicatory jurisdiction in Indian country should
be shaped by the guiding principles that the Court announced in
each of its landmark adjudicatory jurisdiction cases, rather than
by the bare facts of those cases. Instead of mechanically applying
identity-based rules, courts should refocus the analysis in a par-
ticularized and principled determination of the borders of tribal,
274. Brown & Desmond, supra note 154, at 270.
275. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 389 n.14 (1976) (quoting Santa Rosa
Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975)).
276. In Krempel v. Prairie Island Indian Community, 888 F. Supp. 106, 107 (D.
Minn. 1995), for instance, the court ordered the litigants to tribal court to exhaust
their tribal remedies. Although the tribal court was not operational at the time the
lawsuit was removed to federal court, it began to exercise its judicial powers shortly
thereafter. See id. at 107-08. The court therefore dismissed the lawsuit and insisted
that federal policies of encouraging tribal sovereignty required the litigants to pursue
their remedies in tribal court. See id. at 108.
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state, and federal adjudicatory power in a specific dispute. Most
importantly, this approach would allow a realistic appraisal of the
tribal court involved in the dispute and the tribe's sovereign inter-
est. Of course, the application of broad judicial principles would
sacrifice the predictability offered by the current per se rules.
Nevertheless, as this Section argues, the proposed particularized
approach is more faithful to the important concerns underlying
the Court's rules.
A. "To make their own laws and be ruled by them" '
The specific holding of Williams v. Lee removed from state court
jurisdiction the power to adjudicate a lawsuit filed by a non-Indi-
an against Indian defendants residing on the reservation when
the cause of action occurred exclusively on the reservation." In
one of the most frequently cited passages in federal Indian law,
the Court opined that state court adjudication would infringe on
"the right of reservation Indians' to make their own laws and be
ruled by them."279 On closer reflection, the claim of infringement
is somewhat perplexing. Adjudication by a forum other than the
tribal court, of course, could protect the sovereign interest empha-
sized by the Court so long as the nontribal court accurately iden-
tified and applied tribal law. The Court's conclusion of infringe-
ment, then, assumed either that the state court would not apply
tribal law to the on-reservation dispute before it or that it would
apply tribal law improperly. Without that underlying assumption,
the infringement largely disappears; if a nontribal court faithfully
applies tribal law, the tribe and its members still will be able to
"make their own laws and be ruled by them.""0
When Williams was decided in 1959, tribal law was largely
inaccessible to nontribal courts,2"' and the infringement of tribal
sovereignty was inevitable. Nearly forty years later, however,
that is no longer the case. A few nontribal courts have in fact
applied tribal law, and others have expressed a willingness to do
277. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
278. See id. at 223.
279. Id at 220.
280. L
281. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
1997] 595
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
so in appropriate cases. 2 Moreover, a growing number of state
courts recognize and enforce tribal court judgments,' further
ensuring that tribes will be able to make, and be ruled by, their
own laws. The continuing expansion and formalization of tribal
law, both statutory and judicially created,' in conjunction with
the increasing sophistication of tribal courts and the recognition
of tribal court legitimacy by nontribal forums, suggest, not that
the rules of Williams should be abandoned now, but rather that
the courts must be sensitive to factual developments that one day
may make the rules unnecessary.
Ironically, and far more damaging, to tribal sovereign interests,
the rule of Williams has been increasingly applied to frustrate the
tribes' abilities to govern themselves. When reduced to an auto-
matic, identity-based access rule, lower courts give no consider-
ation to tribal sovereign interests when the plaintiff is an Indian
or when substantial off-reservation contacts are present. In those
cases, state adjudicatory jurisdiction is held to be proper automat-
ically, and tribal sovereign interests become irrelevant.2" As
more and more disputes in Indian country involve off-reservation
contacts and non-Indian entities, reducing Williams to a narrow
core of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction renders the case increas-
ingly unimportant to the protection of tribal sovereignty.'
Refocusing on the principles of Williams and its progeny, rather
than limiting the judicial application to its narrow facts, will
encourage lower courts to engage in a more thorough evaluation
of relevant tribal interests. Assumption of state court adjudicato-
282. See, e.g., Jim v. CIT Fin. Serv. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975); Chischilly v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 629 P.2d 340 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 628
P.2d 683 (N.M. 1981); Lewis v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Okla. Hous. Auth., 896 P.2d 503
(Okla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 476 (1995).
283. For a comprehensive review of the cross-reservation enforcement of judgments,
see Laurence, supra note 37; see also Deloria & Laurence, supra note 105, at 421-51
(proposing guidelines for state-tribal-negotiated solutions to the enforcement of judg-
ments problem).
284. In Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber
describes the growth and development of tribal courts, see Valencia-Weber, supra
note 19, at 232-37, and illustrates the importance of custom in tribal court decision
making. See id. at 250-55; see also Taylor, supra note 152 (discussing the current
status of tribal law).
285. See discussion supra Part II.AL3.
286. See id.
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ry jurisdiction should not automatically mean that tribal law is
irrelevant to a dispute, just as the law of other states does not
become irrelevant merely because adjudicatory jurisdiction is
proper in more than one state forum. 7 Until state courts recog-
nize that tribal sovereign interests may compel a choice of tribal
law in many lawsuits involving Indian litigants and on-reserva-
tion contacts, the sovereignty of Indian tribes will never be fully
realized.
B. To Ensure an "effective means of securing relief for civil
wrongs"'
Coming on the heels of Williams, the Wold decisions' clearly
articulated support for state court adjudication of cases brought
by tribes or individual Indians seems confusing indeed. After all,
if state court adjudication of an on-reservation dispute between
Indians and non-Indians infringes tribal sovereignty when the
non-Indian is the plaintiff, those same tribal sovereign interests
would seem to be implicated when the Indian party is the plain-
tiff. 9 Alternatively, if the basis of the Wold holdings is that In-
dian plaintiffs deserve equal access to state judicial forums, we
are left to wonder why that access is denied to the non-Indian
plaintiff who sues an Indian in an identical on-reservation dis-
pute. The marked contrast between Wold and Williams, then, is
that while Williams establishes exclusive tribal court adjudica-
tion of a dispute filed by a non-Indian plaintiff, Wold essentially
allows the Indian plaintiff to choose a state or tribal forum.29 A
closer look at the factual context in which this identity-based
dichotomy evolved, however, is illuminating.
Two important factual realities justified the Court's insistence
287. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
288. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 889 (1986) (Wold II).
289. In Wold II, however, the Supreme Court stressed that "tribal autonomy and
self-government are not impeded when a State allows an Indian to enter its court to
seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country." Id. at
888.
290. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 166 (1984)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Wold 1) ("Petitioner wants to enjoy the full benefits of
the state courts as plaintiff without ever running the risk of appearing as defen-
dant.").
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in the Wold cases that state courts open their doors to Indian
plaintiffs, even though Williams forced its non-Indian plaintiff to
tribal court. For one thing, as the Court itself stressed, the non-
Indian plaintiff in Williams had access to the Navajo Courts of In-
dian Offenses, a judicial system having "broad criminal and civil
jurisdiction which covers suits by outsiders against Indian de-
fendants.""' In Wold, by contrast, the tribal plaintiffs had no
meaningful alternative tribal forum.292 Moreover, although a
tribal court judgment against the Indian defendant in Williams
would be readily enforceable because of the Indian's reservation
status, a tribal court judgment against Wold's non-Indian defen-
dant would have faced numerous barriers to enforcement in the
state system."' Viewed in this light, the "magical alignment
rules" of state and tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction can be
justified, not as creating different rules for Indian and non-Indian
litigants, but rather as recognizing the differing realities of the
court systems available in both cases. Until tribal courts are fully
operational and tribal court judgments are readily recognized by
state courts, it is unlikely that all Indian plaintiffs can be said to
have a "meaningful alternative" to state court adjudication.
C. To Ensure "proper deference to the tribal court system"
The Supreme Court's exhaustion doctrine is based squarely on
its attempt to implement Congress's commitment to "tribal self-
government and self-determination."2" Upon closer inspection,
however, a substantial portion of that judicially created doctrine
291. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959).
292. In Wold II, the Court concluded that states cannot disclaim jurisdiction "over
suits by tribal plaintiffs against non-Indians for which there is no other forum,"
Wold II, 476 U.S. at 883, and stressed that the tribal plaintiff had no "meaningful
alternative to state adjudication." Id. at 889; see also Wold I, 467 U.S. at 14142
(stating that [alt the time the suit was filed, petitioner's tribal court did not have
jurisdiction over a claim by an Indian against a non-Indian in the absence of an
agreement by the parties").
293. See Wold II, 476 U.S. at 889.
294. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856
(1985). In Iowa Mutual, the Court noted the "federal policy favoring tribal self-govern-
ment" and stressed that "the Federal Government has consistently encouraged" the de-
velopment of tribal courts. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
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is restrictive and detrimental to the development of the tribal
court power the Court so frequently lauds. In National Farmers
Union, the Court first had to determine whether the litigant's
challenge to tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction even fell within
the scope of the district court's subject matter jurisdiction.295
Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that this issue did not
constitute a federal question,' the Supreme Court concluded
that all challenges to the scope of tribal jurisdiction were indeed
questions "arising under" federal law.' With that astonishingly
broad definition of federal question jurisdiction, the Court essen-
tially decided that any aspect of any tribal court decision was now
reviewable in federal district court.
Though the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies can be
criticized for its broad definition of federal question jurisdic-
tion,29 some writers have welcomed it as a manifestation of the
Supreme Court's willingness to give tribal courts some badly
needed breathing room 9 in which to develop their own juris-
prudence. Respect for tribal court decisions will never exist, the
argument goes, until the tribal courts actually are allowed to
adjudicate cases. By requiring the federal courts to defer large
numbers of lawsuits to tribal forums, then, the exhaustion rule
does facilitate the realization of clearly articulated congressional
goals of tribal self-government. However, by creating easy ave-
nues of post-tribal court challenges in federal courts,300 and by
295. See National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 852.
296. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d
1320, 1322-24 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
297. See National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 852-53.
298. Although there is substantial variation among federal courts in the application
of the exhaustion doctrine, most courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction over a
wide range of lawsuits related to or involving Indians, leading one dissenting judge
to criticize what he saw as the federal courts' willingness to require exhaustion for
any lawsuit involving even the most minimal and '[tialismanice connection with Indi-
an affairs. Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 921 (9th Cir. 1992)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
299. See, e.g., Pommersheim, Crucible, supra note 19, at 329 (describing exhaustion
doctrine as a judicial attempt to "curb the most prevalent attempts to undermine
and circumvent tribal court jurisdiction"); Resnik, supra note 152, at 731-32 (praising
exhaustion decisions as recognizing the intrusiveness of federal adjudication).
300. Some courts have described the tribal exhaustion doctrine as giving tribal
courts the "first crack" at the factual and legal issues in a lawsuit, thus clearly con-
templating the availability of a "second crack," presumably by the federal courts. See
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almost automatically preferring tribal court adjudication over
state or federal forums with equally substantial interests in the
lawsuit,"0 ' the exhaustion rule cannot constitute a lasting state-
ment of the scope of adjudicatory competence of tribal courts. Its
legitimacy depends on its ability to facilitate tribal court devel-
opment; as that crucial need is met, the doctrine's persuasiveness
will diminish correspondingly. As a practical matter, the Court's
extremely broad definition of federal question jurisdiction within
the contours of the exhaustion doctrine might be explained by the
fact that, under well-established precedent, tribal governmental
actions are not subject to federal constitutional review."0 2 More-
over, the Court has also held that Congress's decision to impose
Bill of Rights-type restrictions on tribal governments did not
create a cause of action in federal court.0 ' If the exhaustion doc-
trine had not been based on a broad definition of federal question
jurisdiction, a greatly increased number of tribal court decisions
involving non-Indians, therefore, would have been immune from
Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403, 406 (W.D.N.C. 1993) (quot-
ing Stock West, 942 F.2d at 660); see also Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798
F.2d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 1986) (ordering exhaustion of tribal remedies so that trib-
al court would have the "first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for
the challenge").
301. The Supreme Court's adherence to its own exhaustion rules, however, has been
less than exemplary. In several post-National Farmers Union cases, the Court resolved
challenges to the scope of tribal regulatory power without mentioning the exhaustion
doctrine. Kerr-McGee Corp. u. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985), which was
decided the same term as National Farmers Union, involved a challenge to the power of
a tribe to impose a tax on non-Indian lessees. Similarly, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), evaluated the legitimacy of
tribal regulatory zoning jurisdiction. In South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993),
the Court considered the power of a tribe to prevent non-Indian hunters from hunting on
lands within the borders of the reservation. In each of these cases, the Court evaluated
the legal challenges to the tribe's regulatory power without mentioning the possibility of
preliminary tribal court review.
302. In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), the Supreme Court held that the
Fifth Amendment's requirement of a grand jury did not apply to the Cherokee na-
tion because the tribe's sovereignty existed independently of the United States Con-
stitution. See id. at 383-85. The basis of that holding was reaffirmed in United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), in which the Court held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not apply to prevent federal prosecution after tribal punish-
ment. See id.. at 328-30. For an analysis of that decision, see Robert Laurence, Dom-
inant-Society Law and Tribal Court Adjudication, 25 N.M. L. REV. 1 (1995).
303. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
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federal court review.
A proposal for reviewing tribal court decisions by writ of cer-
tiorari is more respectful of the sovereignty and independence of
the tribal court system, yet still cognizant of the need for some
ultimate check on the exercise of tribal sovereign powers.'" This
limited review, especially if coupled with a redefinition of federal
question jurisdiction in order to exclude the scope of tribal court
adjudicatory jurisdiction, would release tribal courts from poten-
tially endless second-guessing of all aspects of their decision mak-
ing by federal district courts. At the same time, it would ensure
that the tribal court system is brought within the federal system
of checks and balances. Full development of wide-ranging tribal
court powers, especially in lawsuits involving non-Indians, is
unlikely. to occur without some form of nontribal check on those
powers.
For the time being, perhaps, the exhaustion rules appropriately
serve the laudable purpose of allowing tribal courts the oppor-
tunity to engage in decision making over a wide range of topics
that otherwise might be litigated in a nontribal forum. As a per-
manent demarcation of the adjudicatory jurisdiction of tribal
courts, however, the rules are far too expansive in their definition
of federal question jurisdiction to facilitate meaningful tribal self-
determination."5 Some federal review of tribal court decision
making, however, seems to be an inevitable precondition for the
fullest development of those powers.
304. Others have noted that total independence of tribal court proceedings is not
an acceptable alternative. See Clinton, Tribal Courts, supra note 151, at 889; Robert
Laurence, A Memorandum to the Class, in Which the Teacher Is Finally Pinned
Down and Forced To Divulge His Thoughts on What Indian Law Should Be, 46 ARK.
L. REV. 1, 4-15 (1993). Professor Judith Resnik has observed that pressures for fed-
eral court review may stem either from antitribal sentiment or from deeply rooted
concerns about enforcement of federal standards of equality. See Resnik, supra note
152, at 747-58.
305. As postexhaustion challenges to tribal court holdings begin to make their way
to federal district court, the scope of federal review of tribal court decisions appears
broad and relatively unimpaired by the tribal court opinions rendered in the same
litigation. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. One federal district court
stated that the tribal court's ruling was "helpful" to the federal court's resolution of
the issue. Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Hatch, 890 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (W.D. Okla. 1995),
affd sub nom. Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, Nos. 95-6287, 95-6292, 1996 WL
477560 (10th Cir. 1996).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the current set of rules delineating tribal court adju-
dicatory jurisdiction contains numerous inconsistencies and fails
to create a cogent theory of tribal court adjudication, now is not
the time for substantial overhaul. In spite of their many short-
comings, these rules currently work, though sometimes illogical-
ly and uncomfortably, to allow tribal courts to develop without
undue interference or encroachment from nontribal judicial sys-
tems. What is needed, however, is a reconceptualization of the
Supreme Court's cases, not as mere pronouncements of per se,
identity-based rules, but rather as the articulation of fundamen-
tal principles that should shape judicial analysis. As the factual
assumptions underlying the specific results in Williams, Wold I
and Wold II, and National Farmers Union change, as tribal
courts become more firmly entrenched, and as they receive more
widespread recognition from existing judicial forums, the specific
results in those cases may become less defensible. When the
rules can no longer be justified as necessary measures to protect
against nontribal court encroachment, they will begin to fall un-
der the weight of their own illogic and inconsistency. What will
remain are the unyielding judicial principles that those cases
embody, applying to new factual realities and producing differ-
ent results, while recognizing that the important constant in
tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction should be the preservation
and promotion of tribal court self-determination and develop-
ment.
This Article has shown the inconsistency and analytical short-
comings of the current set of allocational rules. In response,
however, this Article has suggested, not a wholesale rejection of
the judicially created parameters of tribal court adjudicatory
jurisdiction, but rather a reformulation of the Supreme Court's
holdings that will transform their legacy from a series of me-
chanical, per se rules into a powerful set of guiding principles
that should apply on a case-by-case basis to determine the scope
of state, federal, and tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction in In-
dian law. Recasting the holdings in such a manner is necessary,
not only to release the rules from their illogical inconsistency,
but also to ensure that the judicial theory will be responsive to
the rapid developments of tribal court adjudicatory powers in
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the way that will most appropriately realize Congress's oft-stat-
ed goal of enhanced tribal court legitimacy for Indians and non-
Indians alike.
